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Abstract 
Hong Kong is well-known as a “concrete jungle’ for years with high-rise buildings found in 
most places, especially the urban districts. Large-scale and high-rise residential developments 
are one of the components of this city pattern. The rapid growing population in Hong Kong 
between 1970s and 1990s brought the evolution of this kind of development which can 
provide more shelter to meet the housing demand and ancillary and comprehensive facilities 
are often attached to the development.  Also, there were concerns from the medium and 
small size developers that requested the government to put more small and medium size lots 
on the Application List or divide the large land lots into several smaller size lots, so that they 
can participate and promote competition in the property development market, since the 
market is known to be highly concentrated and possibly not contestable.  Also, for years the 
private residential property industry in Hong Kong is always considered to be profitable. The 
Consumer Council 1996 report, “How competitive is the private residential property 
market?”, provided insights to investigate the economic structure of the property 
development market and its relationship to several socially-related aspects such as price level 
and the government policies. However, very little research investigates the linkage between 
the property development market structure to profitability of developers.  
 
This study investigates the market structure of the private residential property development 
market during 1991-2006 as well as the developers’ market behavior in conducting 
large-scale developments in Hong Kong. It is found that the market is highly concentrated 
with few developers holding a large market share of new housing units and low contestability 
of the market is the result of the market structure. The government regulatory arrangements, 
either the land or housing policies, have systematically favoured the large developers and 
helped them to maintain their market shares. Also, the market behavior of large developers in 
  
iv 
pricing, marketing and development strategies established entry barriers to the market which 
reduced the incentive of potential entrants and differentiated them from small developers. 
Therefore, the large developers were able to sustain large market shares and maintain their 
market power in the private residential property market, and a significant ANOVA result for 
the relationship between market share and profitability was identified.  
 
Government, developers and interested investors should take into account the mentioned 
market structure when they are making decisions in either policies implementation or 
investment activities.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Hong Kong is one of the most densely populated cities in the world, which occupies a total 
land area of 1,098 km2 but 80% of the area are mountainous and hard to develop using 
conventional technologies. Moreover, with the increasing population currently approximated 
at 6.9 million, management of housing and land resources is a continuously critical issue for 
the Hong Kong government. It has two roles in the real estate market, the solely land supplier 
and public housing developers. As the consequence of the history, almost all lands in Hong 
Kong are owned by the government which can therefore control and influence the property 
market in different ways. In addition, the responsibility of the housing supply, besides the 
public housing provided by the government, is also shared by the private property developers.  
 
Hong Kong real estate developers are renowned to be profitable for the past decades. It 
induced people’s interest to explore why they are so profitable. Economists suggested the 
market structure of the real estate development industry do constitutes to this situation. 
Consumer Council, which wanted to find out if there is any discrimination to consumer in the 
property market, launched an investigation on the competition in the market in 1996 and 
found out the market is highly concentrated and not competitive which majority of market 
share are in the hand of those large developers with lack of threat from potential market 
entrants. It claimed that the marketing strategies of developers and the nature of the private 
housing market are the roots of this structure. Also, the relationship of the market share and 
profitability of the developers was addressed in the report and the council suggested the 
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government to impose policies aiming to reduce the entry barriers. Though the investigation 
finds no conclusive evidence on the availability of economic profits to the developers, it 
paved a way for researchers to investigate the property development industry.  
 
Diverse views on the competition of the market were raised and they also look at the 
influence of the government land and housing policies and the developers’ behavior to the 
property development market so as to address its contestability, which investigate if the 
market structure established a barrier for entrants to enter and exit the market.  
 
Also, concerning the land disposal system, the medium and small developers demanded the 
government to divide the large land lots into several small and medium size lots so that they 
can afford to participate in the auction, since it is noticed that those large developers usually 
win the bid of those large land lots. Due to this reason, they suggested that those large 
developers can dominate both the land and private residential property market as they can 
develop large-scale development on their lands. However, researchers suggested that it is 
nonsense that the huge auctioned lot sizes favor the well-capitalized developers. Therefore, it 
is worth to find out whether large-scale developments favor the large developers and affect 
the market structure.  
 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to present an analysis of the market structure of the 
private residential property market, as well as the behavior of large developers in developing 
large-scale developments in Hong Kong and the government regulatory arrangements, to 
assess its relationship to the developers’ profitability. It is hoped that the study will provide 
society, developers and government with insights into the market and facilitate better 
decisions in either business strategies or government policies.  
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1.2. Objectives 
 
The objectives of this dissertation are as follows: 
 
- To analyse the structure of the private residential property development industry in Hong 
Kong 
- To investigate the economic reasons for developers to prefer development of large-scale 
developments; and 
- To examine the relationship between market share and profitability of the developers.  
 
1.3. Methodology and Data 
 
The study is divided into two parts. The first part presents a background analysis on the 
private residential property development market, of which the market situation in term of 
concentration, demand and supply, the competition and contestability are discussed and 
analyzed. Journals, books and the published secondary source of data relating to new land and 
housing supply as well as the government regulatory policies regarding these aspects will be 
studied. 
 
The second part of the study identifies the relationship between market share and the 
developers’ profitability, with reference to the previous literatures and analysis concerning the 
market structure. Developers’ respective market shares are based on their annual supply of the 
new residential units among the analyzed developers. Moreover, Return on Assets (ROA) will 
be adopted as the developers’ profitability rate and of which together with the market share 
can be gathered from the listed company annual reports. A One-way ANOVA analysis is 
conducted to examine the mentioned relationship. The results are presented and analyzed.  
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1.4. Structure of the Study 
 
The framework of this study is divided into six chapters. This introduction chapter is followed 
by a chapter of theoretical reviews, Chapter 2, in which the previous theoretical studies 
related to this study are illustrated. It will include concepts and theories in industrial 
economics including market concentration, barriers to entry, contestability. Also, the relevant 
theoretical and empirical studies to the relationship of market share and profitability will be 
discussed in the chapter.  
 
Chapter 3 gives an overview together with an in-depth analysis to the private residential 
property development market in Hong Kong. This offers the readers a general understanding 
to the background, performance as well as the market structure of the private housing market 
in Hong Kong. In addition, certain kinds of regulatory arrangement related to the private 
residential market and the developers’ behavior will also be studied so as to analyze its 
influence to the market structure.  
 
In Chapter 4, the propositions and methodology of this study are put forward and illustrated in 
detail to show the rationale of the dissertation and the analysis method. Moreover, the 
empirical model, variables and data used for the analysis will be specified and explained and 
also the expectations of the empirical results and the detailed steps in achieving the results 
will also be included. 
 
Chapter 5 will then show the empirical results of this study. Analysis and implications of the 
findings will be discussed. Finally, the main findings and observations in this study, together 
with the limitations and further study areas of this study will be concluded in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Reviews 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation investigates the rationale for the Hong Kong private residential developers to 
develop large-scale developments. Before analysis, it is important to review the basic 
economic foundation and related definitions and theories that are being offered to explain the 
situation. In this chapter, literatures will be reviewed to develop the ground work with those 
supported economic theories for the relationship between market share and profitability, 
which was first introduced by the industrial economics institutions and later on gained 
supports with three mainstream theories. However, some researchers do not agree with the 
mentioned relationship and raised several criticisms towards the mainstream theories which 
will also be included in this chapter.  
 
Right before that, many economists developed models to analysis the market structure and 
market behavior, therefore, factors affecting the market structure and behavior can be 
identified and they are important and essential to the discussion in the later chapter which will 
focus on the Hong Kong private residential development industry. Therefore, theoretical 
structure of the housing market will be discussed too. Moreover, most of those models are 
founded by the original thought of Industrial Organization Economics. Ideas like oligopolistic 
competition, nature of barrier to entry, contestability as well as the necessity of including 
government actions when analyzing a market were pointed out by economists and all these 
will be discussed in the following sections.  
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2.2. Industrial Economics 
 
Industrial economics was developed from the Theory of Firm. It comprised of the analysis of 
different market structures and its implications for economic welfare. It concerns the 
economic aspects of firms’ behavior, market structure, costs and competition.  
 
According to Hay & Morris (1991), the theory of firm as suggested by Adam Smith, in Wealth 
of Nations, the forces of competition would drive the market price into equality with the 
natural price (which is the same as the cost). However, there are deviations between the 
market price and natural price, he concluded that if one product commanded a higher market 
price than another it was because of the higher costs of the factors of production required to 
produce it. Marshall in 1890 pointed out the idea that value was independent of market price 
and was determined by both supply and demand equally. Also, he retained the view that 
competition generally ensured the equality of price with unit costs of production and the firm 
in the position of monopoly was generally temporary. Obviously, their works were based on 
the presumption on the characteristics in perfect competition which is the independence of 
buyers and sellers as well as the information about transactions.  
 
Jevons and Edgeworth established the condition that equating price and average cost and the 
absence of monopoly profits would follow. Knight refined the Perfection Competition model 
and identified a long list of necessary conditions for the elimination of supernormal profits at 
minimum average cost. He also applied the marginal analysis to the case that discussed by 
Marshall in monopoly, the absence of competition. However, the mentioned economists’ 
approach, from deductive school based on the precise assumptions, had little concern with the 
general and abstract principle of the economic behavior and also the empirical data. Therefore, 
there was a gap between the theoretical analysis and the actual general principle, thus the 
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observed and specific economic behavior cannot be explained. Afterwards, there was a deep 
division between the deductive school and empirical school.  
 
The empirical school studied the behavior of one or more industries in the descriptive level. It 
covers the lives of the dominant personalities, the organizational structure, the history of the 
firms’ product development and their activities. Profits and efficiency were also covered, but 
resource allocation and welfare was not. However, the studies were little rigor and had few 
generalized conclusions. Chamberlin filled the gap between the two schools. He focused on 
the product differentiation and downward-sloping demand curve and proposed the theory of 
monopolistic competition which began to pay attention to the individual firm rather than the 
industry and become a mainstream of the microeconomic theory. Chamberlin’s belief but then 
criticized and attacks on his model were numerous, and the monopolistic competition model 
failed in both theoretically and empirically. Nevertheless, it paved a way for the development 
of current industrial economics. He provided a basis for Mason and Bain to generate the 
empirically testable hypotheses about the structure-performance relationship (Fig 2.1). Also, 
the central role of new entry into an industry and the barriers facing potential entrants was 
brought out by Chamberlin which later on Bain (1956) studied and demonstrated its 
significance. He also catalyzed the development of oligopoly theory which took into account 
of the rivals reactions and fewness of firm in the market.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Bain’s S-C-P model 
 
Also, economists utilized the industry-based theory developed in the industrial economics to 
analyze the industry and develop business strategy. Porter (1980) mentioned that if superior 
Basic 
Condition 
Structure of 
industry 
Conduct 
of firms 
Economic 
performance 
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financial performance results primarily from industry factors, choosing the industries in 
which to compete and/or altering the structure of chosen industries to increase monopoly 
power should be the focus of strategy (Hunt, 2000). Montgomery and Porter (1991 cited in 
Hunt 2000) mentioned that researches, such as Schmalensee (1985), had continued to affirm 
the important role industry conditions play in the performance of individual firms. And they 
supported the notion that the industry analysis should play a vital role in strategy formation as 
recent studies had repeatedly shown average industry profitability is the most significant 
predictor of firm performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Porter Five Forces Framework 
 
Besides Bain’s SCP paradigm, Porter (1980) also suggested the similar model (Fig. 2.2) 
which is the “five forces” framework to analysis the market behavior. It suggested that the 
profitability of a firm in an industry is determined by (1) the threat of new entrants to the 
industry, (2) the threat of substitute products or services, (3) the bargaining power of its 
supplier, (4) the bargaining power of its customers, and (5) the intensity of rivalry amongst its 
existing competitors. The first two forces constitute industry competition, which continually 
works to drive down the rate of return on invested capital toward the competitive floor rate of 
Bargaining power of 
the buyers 
Bargaining power  
of the suppliers 
Threat of new entrants 
Potential 
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Suppliers 
Industry Competitors 
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return, or the return that would be earned by economist’s ‘perfect competitive’ industry. 
However, because a firm is not a prisoner of its industry’s structure, it will implement 
strategies aim at altering industry structure by raising barriers to entry and increasing its 
bargaining power over suppliers and customers. Therefore, for the later section, the concepts 
of barriers to entry will be discussed. 
 
2.3. Oligopolistic Competition 
 
From the elementary theory the economic performance to expect from two market structures: 
perfect competition leads to an optimum performance while monopoly leads to distortions. 
However, most observed industrial structures, however, are oligopolistic. Oligopoly is a 
market dominated by a small number of providers and firms operate under imperfect 
competition. The firms offer differentiated products and barriers to entry are strong. Often, an 
oligopoly is defined as an industry or market in which the top four businesses have a 
concentration ratio above 40 per cent. Industrial economists have accordingly tried to model 
such competition. Cournot’s duopoly model and Bertrand’s model are two significant models 
to model the behavior of oligopolies. However, there are differences between the two models. 
In Cournot’s duopoly, the firms are deemed to be quantity-makers while in Bertrand’s 
oligopoly, the firms are deemed to be price-takers.   
 
For the Cournot’s model (Fig 2.3), it assumed that the each firm select its output volume and 
believes that its rival will not change its output and respond to its own decisions at all. 
Therefore, it suggested that oligopoly shares in the sins of monopoly to some degree where 
buyers are overcharged and undersupplied to an extent determined by the level of 
concentration in the industry. This provided a basis for much early work in industrial 
economics and the testing of relationships between structure and profits.  
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However, if oligopolists behave like those in Bertrand’s model (Fig 2.4), Cournot’s prediction 
can be dismissed as baseless as the incumbents engage in ferocious price warfare. And the 
result is that the industry has prices, output and profits which are the same as under perfect 
competition. 
 
Figure 2.3 Cournot’s duopoly model 
 
Figure 2.4 Bertrand’s model 
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2.4. Theoretical nature of the residential property market 
 
Before looking at the market structure of the Hong Kong private residential market, we 
should first understand the theoretical nature of the residential market together with those 
economic literatures concerning the nature of competition.  
 
2.4.1. Perfect Competition in the Housing market 
 
Maclennan (1982) identified nine assumptions for the housing market followed the 
neo-classical economics theory: 
 
(a) There are many buyers and sellers. 
(b) In relation to the aggregate volume of transactions, the sales and purchases of each 
household are insignificant. 
(c) There is no collusion amongst or between buyers or sellers. 
(d) There is free entry into and exit from the market for both consumers and producers. 
(e) Consumers have continuous, transitive and established preferences over a wide range of 
alternative choices of housing and no-housing goods. 
(f) Consumers and producers possess both knowledge with respect to prevailing prices and 
current bids and perfect foresight with respect to future prices and future bids. 
(g) Consumers maximize total utility whilst producers maximize total profits. 
(h) There are no artificial (non-price) restrictions placed on the demands for suppliers and 
prices of housing service and resources used to produce housing service. 
(i) The market is assumed to be in equilibrium. 
According to this framework, economists view the market as the natural one and the invisible 
hand of the price mechanism will organize the production and exchange itself.  
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2.4.2. The Modern Real Estate Paradigm and the Fisher-DiPasquale -Wheaton 
(FDW) model 
 
As discussed before, the housing market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. One of the 
modern real estate paradigm, Fisher-DiPasquale-Wheaton (FDW) model, is also constructed 
based on this assumption. The FDW model provides insight to identify the factors affecting 
the market structure and to what extent those factors are affecting the structure. It is generated 
from the economic principles applied to capital goods, including real estate assets. The use of 
the model required to consider a range of important structural and dynamic factors for the 
analysis of a particular market.  
 
 
Figure 2.5 The Quadrant FDW Model 
 
The FDW model consists of four building blocks (Fig 2.5) and form one multi-directional 
framework showing the relationship between common variables in different processes. It can 
be used to analyze the stock-flow relationship of the housing market. First, it is based on the 
nature of price equilibrium in housing markets. The model assumes that housing supply is 
fixed in the short run, and the price of housing services is determined by housing supply and 
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demand. And then, the equilibrium price is the market rent. In turn, the market rent and the 
discount rate, that shows the opportunity cost of new land and expectations of future growth, 
determine the price of housing stock, and the price of housing stock and construction costs 
jointly determine the number of housing starts (Smith 1974, 1988). Housing starts represent 
the change in the stock of housing, net of removals. The new housing supply through the flow 
market should adjust to eliminate the shortage or surplus in the stock market to reach the 
overall equilibrium.   
 
In the theoretical literature, development occurs instantly to meet the changing housing 
market equilibrium. However, in reality due to the incomplete information on the housing 
market, there are delays in developing land from non-urban uses and then in constructing 
residential units on these lots. The adjustment in new housing supply may not perfectly match 
the shortage or surplus in the housing market. Therefore, the adjustment exhibits a continuous 
and dynamic process. And also, with these delays, developers are necessary to forecast 
demand of several periods in advance of their expected completion dates.  
 
2.4.3. Critics to the assumption of perfect competition 
 
However, the reality is not the same as what the theory suggested. Whitehead (1974) 
conducted an econometric study for the United Kingdom housing market. She claimed that 
the housing market is inherently imperfect, but she noted that the nature and extent of such 
imperfections is difficult to be measured since purchasers routinely trade off different 
attributes of the housing unit, such as size, type, location and price. As mention before, she 
pointed out that the supply of housing cannot increase rapidly and there are lags in supply 
because new buildings usually account for only a small portion of the total housing stock. 
Lastly, she mentioned that governments intervene in housing markets in many ways, and 
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these should be taken into account when analyzing the market. 
 
Barlow and Duncan (1994 cited in Yam 2002) stated that markets are normally inefficient in 
three ways. First, ‘productive efficiency’, where the production of a commodity at the 
minimum possible cost cannot be achieved, therefore, resources are wasted. Second, 
‘allocative efficiency’, where consumer wants are met as effectively as possible, cannot be 
reached. Third, it is highly unlikely that ‘dynamic efficiency’, where firms and economies 
plan, innovate and develop for the maximum efficiency over the long term, can ever be 
possible in free market systems.  
Therefore, the conventional economics, which regards the market as an optimized and distinct 
one, is unlikely to reflect the realities of the housing market. And the reality of the housing 
market is a socially created and sub-optimal market institution that is supported and 
maintained by organizational structures including government action.  
 
2.5. Barriers to entry 
 
The term “barriers to entry” first appear in Chamberlin (1933) journal, that "Competitive 
measures which did not truly measure efficiency should be eliminated; and, by implication at 
least, any other barriers to free entry except those inherent in differing personal qualities or 
ability to obtain capital should be removed". And later Bain, in order to support his claims, 
carried out some measurement for a cross-section of twenty industries, and found that the size 
and importance of the market characteristics that he believed have an important effect on the 
condition of entry. And his definition is now commonly used to be the source of many 
productive researches on the entry barriers. However, there are still controversies over the 
definition of “barriers to entry”. Bain’s barrier is classified as exogenous sources of barriers 
which are embedded in the underlying conditions of the market. The other sources of barriers 
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are the endogenous sources which are depend on the firm’s own discretion. Porter’s concept 
of mobility barriers recognizes this point.  
 
2.5.1. Bain’s barriers to entry 
 
According to Bain’s definition, a barrier to entry is anything that allows incumbent firms to 
earn above-normal profits without the threat of entry. He classified the barriers to entry in the 
following three groups, i) Economies of scale, ii) Absolute cost advantages and iii) Product 
differentiation advantages. 
 
2.5.1.1. Economies of scale 
 
If low-cost production requires a large scale of output, then new firm attempting to enter a 
market currently occupied by one or more incumbents faces the choice of producing a small 
amount at a substantial cost disadvantage or producing efficiently at large output, thereby 
swamping the market and driving the prevailing product price down. Either strategy might 
well be unprofitable, so economies of scale may discourage new firms from attempting entry. 
In that case incumbent firms will be protected from competition, which in turn may lead to 
monopoly distortions. 
 
2.5.1.2. Absolute cost advantages 
 
It arises from reputation, superior production techniques (either as a result of past experience, 
patented or secret processes, or from control of particular inputs required for production, be it 
materials, labor, management skills, or equipment), and from access to cheaper funds because 
existing firms represent lower risks than new ones.  
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2.5.1.3. Product differentiation advantages 
 
It implies something unique about the product, that it has an attribute others do not share and 
cause buyers to prefer the product of one firm over that of a rival firm. Product differentiation 
may occur in terms of physical appearance, features, durability, ancillary services, image and 
geographic location. It affects the degree of substitutability between products and in turn the 
constellation of demand and supply.   
 
2.5.2. Stigler’s Critics on Bain’s definitions 
 
Stigler (1968), however, rejected the notion that scale economies and capital requirements are 
barriers to entry. He defined a barrier to entry as a cost that must be borne by a firm that seeks 
to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry. As he suggested, with 
equal access to technology, economies of scale are not a barrier to entry and capital 
requirements are not a barrier to entry either unless the incumbent never paid them. 
 
2.5.3. Baumol’s contestable markets 
 
Baumol (1982) pointed out that the condition of free entry should not be taken to imply that it 
is costless or easy to enter, but rather that the “entrant suffers no disadvantage in terms of 
production technique or perceived product quality relative to the incumbent.” This can 
express in way of an absence of sunk costs. If such costs exist, then they may place entrants at 
a competitive disadvantage, and if so then they can be a barrier to entry. Therefore, barrier to 
entry must be something that interferes with competition or, specifically, the competitive 
process (Fisher 1987). It follows that not everything that makes entry appear difficult or 
uninviting is necessarily a barrier to entry. A barrier to entry should permit an incumbent to 
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earn supernormal profits continuously without inducing others to enter and bid those profits 
away. Also, White (1987) interpreted barriers to entry are costs that entrants have to bear 
irrespective of whether incumbents have borne them too. Therefore, under a contestable 
market, entrants can match all advantages of all existing firms with no costs or significant 
lags in entry. Also, sunk cost is zero which mean exit is perfectly free, at no sacrifice of any 
cost.  
 
2.5.4. Conclusion for Barriers to entry 
 
Although Bain’s definition faced many criticisms, his definition is more commonly used to be 
the source of many productive researches on the entry barriers. And Baumol’s contestable 
market theory has also taken Bain’s ideas but in more thoughtful elaboration and therefore, 
his broader definition will be adopted in this dissertation.  
 
In addition to Bain’s three sources of entry barrier, the government policies may also act as 
one of them. Some industries are protected by government limits, requirements and other 
restraints. And Porter (1980) stated that the government policies affect the structural condition 
of an industry. Therefore, a structural analysis should be included a diagnosis of how present 
and future government policy at all level. 
 
2.5.5. Porter’s mobility barrier 
 
Porter (1980) recognized entry barriers arises not only to protect firms in strategic group from 
entry by firms outside the industry, they also provide barrier to shifting of strategic position 
from one strategic group to another. “Mobility barrier”, a kind of entry barriers, means the 
factors that deter the movement of firms from one strategic position to another. Mobility 
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barrier can be used to explain why some firms within the industry can be more profitable. 
Moreover, different strategic group carry different level of mobility barriers which provide 
advantage over other strategic group and generally, the higher the mobility barrier, the greater 
the profit. It is very important for mobility barrier to maintain for firms to sustain their 
competitive position.  
 
2.6. Relationship between market share and profitability 
 
Market share means the percentage share of the market’s total sales revenue. It can also be 
expressed as a company's unit sales volume in a market divided by the total volume of units 
sold in that market. According to Drew and Skitmore (1993) and Shepherd (2004), they 
defined it as is a measure of success and regards it as the most important indicator of a firm’s 
degree of monopoly power. Higher market shares always provide higher monopoly power, 
while low shares involve little or none.  
 
Business planning strategy provides the firms opportunity to have an insight towards the 
competitive environment and locate themselves in a right position within the market in order 
to achieve the best performance possible. Within numerous of analysis approach, the 
growth-share matrix provide the firm to identify their products growth potential with respect 
to the firm market share. From this matrix, it shows a close relationship between the market 
share and profitability and is supported by several economic theories.  
 
2.6.1. Growth-share matrix 
 
Growth-share matrix (Fig 2.6), which also called BCG matrix, is a chart that had been created 
by Henderson (1979) for the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) to provide a framework or an 
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analytical tool to help corporations to analyze their products or business units in order to 
structure the business strategy. It helps the company to allocate their resources appropriate to 
achieve better financial performance. 
 
According to Abell and Hammond (1979), the growth-share matrix is assigned on the basis of 
the product’s market growth rate and market share relative to competition. “The differences in 
growth potential, relative market share, and hence cash flow potential, unique to each product, 
determines which products represent investment opportunities, which should supply 
investment funds, and which should be candidates for elimination from the portfolio. The 
objective is to get the best overall performance from the portfolio, while keeping cash flow in 
balance.” 
 
Figure 2.6 Growth-share matrix 
 
Relative market share is the ratio of the firm’s unit sales of a product to the unit sales of the 
same product by the firm’s largest competitor. A ratio of 1.0 means the firm is tied for the lead 
and high share signifies market leadership. Since relative share is so closely related to related 
to relative experience, relative share is indicative of relative cost. The matrix divided into four 
quadrants, products or firms fall within each quadrant carry different meanings. 
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1. Lower left (Cash Cows): They have a dominant share of slowly growing markets and 
generate large amount of cash which is far more than they can profitably invest.  
2. Lower right (Dogs): They have low share of slowly growing markets and neither generate 
nor require significant amounts of cash. Because of low share their profitability is poor. 
Maintain the share need additional reinvestment. 
3. Upper right (Question Marks): They have low share of fast-growing markets. Since their 
low share often means low profits and weak cash flow from operation, large amounts of 
cash is required to maintain the share in the rapidly growing markets. 
4. Upper left (Stars): They are high-growth high-share products which may or may not be 
self-sufficient in cash flow. This depends on whether their strong cash flow from 
operations is sufficient to finance rapid growth. 
 
The matrix emphasizes the close relationship between market share and profitability. It 
assumed high market share firm can yield high profit and vice versa. And the shifting from 
one quadrant to another affects the cash flow. Cash is needed in sustaining the product growth 
and capturing more market share. Therefore, the most profitable location is the lower left, a 
high-share low growth markets (Cash cows). To summarize, the growth-share matrix actually 
hypothesized that both market share and market growth determine the profitability which is 
based on the theories discussed in the following sections.  
 
2.6.2. Industrial Organization Economics Origins 
 
Early research in industrial organization economics postulated the concentration - profitability 
relationship. Bain (1951) proposed the idea of more concentrated industries should show 
higher profits than those with a lower concentration. Concentrated industry means that large 
proportions of outs are in the hands of small numbers of sellers within the industry. The 
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relationship between market structure and profit performance can refer to the 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm which posits that industry structure variables 
such as concentration influence the firm’s strategy (Conduct) to finally influence its 
performance. The reasons he gave are related to oligopolistic coordination and the barriers to 
entry which means that the firm strives to control the output in the market by collusion to 
drive up prices and profits and exercise monopoly power. As the result, more concentrated 
industries are expected to be more profitable (concentration-profitability doctrine).  
 
2.6.3. Direct effect of market share on profitability 
 
After Bain’s concentration-profitability doctrine, which is focused on the industry level, 
Shepherd (1972) expressed that the superior performance of the firm is actually related to its 
market share, and pointed out that collusion is not necessary in this case since firms can 
achieve higher market share whereas they cannot collude in the reality.  
Buzzell et al (1975) from his Profit Impact of Marketing Strategy which addresses how each 
factor is related to performance and he weighted them according to their relative importance 
in the total equation. He found out that achieving high market share is considered by many to 
be a principal criterion of success in the market place. He then, in his other work with Gale 
(1987), explained that higher market share lead to greater profits because of the market power 
and lower costs resulting from scale effects and learning effects.  
 
Many studies were carried out to explain and test the relationship between market share and 
profitability. And generally three mainstream theories have been raised to provide a ground to 
the relationship. 
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2.6.3.1. Efficiency Theory 
 
Demsetz (1973) pointed out the cost efficiencies for firms with high market shares lead to 
greater profitability. Day and Montgomery (1983) suggested the efficiency theory, it predicted 
businesses with large market shares are more cost efficient due to the experience curve and 
scale effects which finally lead to greater profitability.  
 
2.6.3.1.1. Experience curve 
 
Learning curve (Fig 2.7), the relationship between labour costs and cumulative production, 
was first introduced in 1930s before experience curve. It observed there is a systematic 
decline in the number of labour hours required to produce an airplane. Later, the Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG) generalized the learning effect in 1960s and included all 
value-added costs fall as cumulative volume of a product increase. The relationship between 
costs and experience was called that experience curve. (BCG 1972 cited in Abell & 
Hammond 1979) 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Experience Curve 
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As suggested by Day and Montgomery (1983), there are three major sources of the experience 
curve effect, which are the evidence to support the existence of the effect. They are 1) 
Learning by doing, 2) Technological advances and 3) Scale effect.  
 
Learning helps increasing in efficiency of all aspects of labour input as a result of practice and 
the exercise of ingenuity, skill and increased dexterity in repetitive activities. It also 
encompasses the improvement of the working methods and specialization. Performance from 
production equipment can also improve since the staffs may find new ways to increase its 
output and more familiar with their operation.  
 
Technological improvement includes the new production process. It is an important source of 
cost reduction especially in capital intensive industries. Change in the resource mix, product 
standardization and redesign are also sources of the experience effect.  
 
The scale effect comes from the capitalizing on the size of an operation. It applies to the 
majority of investment and operating costs. Economies of scale enable the reduction in 
production cost. Some experts would include scale as part of the experience effect. Also, the 
economies of scale can also act as entry barrier since the cost disadvantage deter the new 
entrants from entering the market if they expect they will not able to obtain a certain 
magnitude of output.  
 
2.6.3.2. Market Power Theory 
 
The market power theory is proposed by Schroeter (1988) and Staten et al (1988), they 
explained that firm with high market shares is hypothesized to have market power, because 
their size and importance in the market enable them to obtain inputs at lower costs, extract 
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concessions from channel members and set prices rather than being a price taker. Also, 
Shepherd (2004) defined it as the indicator of a firm’s degree of monopoly power in an 
ordinal sense. 
 
2.6.3.3. Product Quality Assessment Theory 
 
One more ground to support the link between market share and profitability is given by 
Smallwood and Conlisk (1979), they proposed the product quality assessment theory, they 
contend that the widespread acceptance of brand provides information to those potential 
customers that it is superior in quality than the lower share brands. And thus, a high market 
share brand can provide a level of customer confidence which cannot be achieved by low 
share brands under an uncertain and imperfect information environment about the product 
performance. As a result, high share brands can set a higher price and receive a superior 
return, return premium relative to low share brands. PIMS data also indicate an additional 
explanation that firms with the high shares tend to have products of higher quality and to 
spend much more on R&D than smaller share firms. They receive higher prices for distinctive, 
high-quality and often innovative products (Abell and Hammond 1979). 
 
2.7. Previous empirical studies on the relationship between market 
share and profitability 
 
Phillips et al (1983) found that market share affects return directly, and also has an indirect 
effect through the reduction of costs.  
 
Prescott et al (1986) considered a series of “Conduct variables” (e.g. capacity utilization, 
relative price, relative quality) under different environments (e.g. mature, decling, emerging) 
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which are hypothesized to be associated with both market share and profitability. Although 
they argue that the market share-profitability relationship is contingent on the environment 
and that significant spurious effects are present, they found significant direct effects.  
 
A subsequent study (Venkatraman & Prescott 1990) examined a different time period with 
distinct economic conditions, and confirmed the direct effects reported by Prescott et al 
(1986), although the size of the direct effects changed in several environments. 
 
However, some studies rejected the statement made by Buzzell. Hergert (1984) found that the 
relationship between market share and profitability is not strong enough when he used return 
on assets (ROA), which is regressed against market share on some 5400 business and 76 
industries. The results were insignificant that only a third of the industries gave the positive 
results. The winner’s curse phenomenon also explains the negative relationship between 
market share and profitability since the winner accepts the price that is unacceptable to all 
other competitors.  
 
Fraering and Minor (1994) also argued the relationship between market share and profitability 
is weak to justify a commitment to achieving market share dominance. They point out that the 
instances of concurrent market share and profitability leadership occur in only a few 
industries or are possible under a severely limited set of circumstances. The few industries 
included home building and shoe manufacturing which were found to have the strongest 
positive link between market share and profitability. Therefore, they concluded that firms 
should not only rely on the pursuit of market share, but also on alternative strategic goals, to 
strive for increasing return on assets.  
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2.7.1. Critics towards the Market share-Profitability Relationship 
 
Despite the relationship of market share and profitability has been supported theoretical and 
empirically, some economists do not agree with the notion and their stands and evidences are 
going to be discussed in this section.  
 
2.7.1.1. Efficiency Theory and experience curve 
 
Schmalensee (1987) stated that most studies of scale economies concluded that U.S. 
manufacturing firms generally need relatively small market share to be at the minimum 
efficient scale. Also, it is not guarantee that experience will lead to the cost reduction. It 
cannot be achieved by natural inclination. Indeed it just provides the management with the 
opportunity to exploit.  
 
Moreover, scale effect may not necessary be the source of the experience effect. Porter (1979) 
supported this argument when cost reductions are being achieved primarily from economies 
of scale through more efficient, automated facilities and vertical integration, then cumulative 
experience may be unimportant to the relative cost position.  
 
2.7.1.2. Market Power Theory 
 
Fisher, McGowan and Greenwood (1983) pointed out that it is not a must that monopoly 
power can be achieved by high market share. They also stated that “when either potential or 
current competitors can expand readily, a firm does not have market power even if it has a 
market share much larger than its rivals”. Furthermore, competition for market share is 
extremely intense. Therefore, large share firm will have more at risk and are sometimes 
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forced into concessions to keep their position and power. 
 
2.7.1.3. Product Quality Assessment Theory 
 
Porter (1980) suggested that high quality image often requires a perception of exclusivity that 
is incompatible with high market share. Increase in market share makes the feeling of 
exclusivity diminish. Also, Jacobson (1988) stated that market share will not create 
comparative advantage when there is little uncertainty about the product performance or they 
rely on other indicators to know the product quality. 
 
2.8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a review of literature regarding studies of industrial economics as well 
as classical competition nature in housing economics. As Bain’s structure- 
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm has provided an insight to understand the underlying 
principles to look at an industry, which suggested the implication that the profitability of firms 
is influenced by the conditions of the market structure. The important concepts of barrier to 
entry have been discussed and Bain’s definition will be adopted in this dissertation, which is 
anything that allows incumbent firms to earn above-normal profits without the threat of entry. 
Economies of scale, absolute cost advantages and product differentiation advantage are the 
principal properties for the entry barriers. Moreover, it is notable that government policy may 
sometimes set up the barrier towards the new entrants to enter the industry.  
 
The relationship between market share and profitability has also been discussed. The 
argument, that there is a positive relationship between these two parameters, is supported by 
three mainstream theories: efficiency theory, market power theory and product quality 
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assessment theory. However, this argument is still challenge by many criticisms. It will be 
interested to conduct a research for the real estate market to see whether the argument is 
applicable or not. After familiar with those economics theories, in the next chapter, the market 
structure of the Hong Kong private residential property development market will be 
discussed. 
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Chapter 3 
Hong Kong Private Residential Property Development 
Market Structure 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The magazine Business Week published its annual “Global 1000” surveys (Figure 3.1) in July 
each year. It lists out the world’s largest firms in them of market value by country and industry. 
In 2000, Hong Kong had the largest and most profitable property firm in the world. And 
because of these brilliant records made by the Hong Kong top-tier developers, the society 
begins to investigate the nature of the property development industry so as to find out the 
reason why they are so profitable.  
 
Hong Kong residential market is unique in several aspects: restricted land supply, high price 
volatility, high appreciation rate, a small group of large developers and a huge public housing 
sector (Lai & Wang 1999). 
 
As the main focus of this dissertation is on the private residential property development 
market in Hong Kong, in this chapter, we will go deep into its structure. According to 
Shepherd (2004), the internal structure of a market is embodied mainly in the size distribution 
of its competing firms which consists of three main elements namely market share, 
concentration and entry barrier.  
 
In addition, though it is found that literatures offer little analysis of the property development 
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industry. However, they provided insights for this study and have a better understanding to the 
market nature. Therefore, those literatures will be reviewed first. Moreover, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, there are several factors influencing the market structure, this chapter will focus on 
those aspects to look at the private residential property development market. Therefore the 
desk analysis will be shown afterwards to facilitate the discussion of the market structure. 
After that, the intensity of rivalry between the existing competitors and also the other special 
features of this market, especially the influence of the government land policies and the 
contestability, will also be investigated.  
 
Figure 3.1 “Global 1000”  
 
(Source: Chiang et al 2002) 
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3.2. Demand 
 
Lau (1992 cited in Lai & Wang 1999) suggests that Hong Kong is one of the most densely 
populated cities in the world. Strong demand for housing has been created from the reduction 
of household size. The decline in the average household size together with a significant 
increase in population means that there has been a strong demand for housing in Hong Kong 
during the period from 1970s to 1990s. Also, there is widespread speculation that the demand 
for housing in Hong Kong is not only for consumption, but also for investment, especially 
during the boom times (Lai & Wang 1999).  Peng and Wheaton (1994) found that the 
housing demand in Hong Kong is price inelastic but income elastic. This means the change of 
demand for housing greatly depending on the people income level, however, the price level is 
not a significant factor in varying the demand. This can support that the bargaining power of 
the home buyers in Hong Kong is relative low.  
 
3.3. Supply 
 
As the supply side of the market is the focus of our study, in the following section, the 
in-depth investigation to its nature of competition and its contestability will be carried out.  
 
3.3.1. Competition 
 
Tracing back to one decade before, several research studies (Consumer Council 1996; Mui 
1997) were carried out on the competitive environment in the Hong Kong property market 
because of the growing concern on the rapid increase in residential property price and the 
huge profit earned by those property developers for that period of time. A highly concentrated 
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and not competitive private residential property market was found and concluded that there is 
the relationship between market share and profitability, but few evidences have been shown to 
support this claim.  
 
From the analysis of the market concentration, of which is measured by calculating the 
market share of the largest developers in Hong Kong in terms of their production of new 
housing units, the internal market structure can be observed. Table 3.1 shows the market share 
for each of the top nine residential developers for the period between 1991 and 2006. It is 
observed that 64% of the new housing units were produced by the top nine residential 
developers and the top 4 developers account for almost 50% of the market shares. Also, 
Figure 3.2 shows that a few major developers have held a consistently dominant market share. 
For 2006, these developers contributed to 96% of the new housing units to the market.  
Table 3.1 Market Concentration of all private residential units (By market share) in 1991-2006 
Market Share 
among 9 
developers 
Sun Hung Kai Cheung Kong 
Henderson 
Land 
Sino Land 
New World 
Development
Hutchison 
Whampoa
Hang Lung 
Development 
Wheelock 
Properties 
(HK) Limited
Kerry 
Properties 
Limited 
1991-1994 10% 26% 10% 6% 4% 0% 9% 3% 0% 
1995 13% 9% 10% 1% 2% 8% 0% 2% 0% 
1996 18% 8% 18% 1% 4% 0% 4% 2% 0% 
1997 23% 6% 6% 4% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1998 13% 15% 2% 4% 6% 2% 2% 8% 1% 
1999 15% 10% 20% 1% 2% 10% 0% 0% 1% 
2000 16% 9% 19% 4% 10% 0% 2% 0% 4% 
2001 18% 14% 5% 10% 5% 1% 0% 0% 4% 
2002 26% 11% 4% 2% 1% 4% 3% 4% 1% 
2003 9% 14% 16% 8% 4% 4% 11% 11% 0% 
2004 20% 20% 0% 9% 4% 2% 7% 1% 4% 
2005 22% 16% 20% 0% 9% 5% 0% 0% 0% 
2006 35% 30% 9% 5% 4% 2% 0% 10% 0% 
1991-2006 18% 15% 12% 5% 4% 3% 4% 3% 1% 
(Source: Consumer Council (1996); Various Company Annual Reports; Property Reviews 1991-2006) 
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Figure 3.2 Aggregate Market Share, 1991-2006 
 
(Source: Various Company Annual Reports) 
 
From the above analysis, it is observed that the supply side of the private residential market 
was highly concentrated. In addition, according to the definition of oligopolistic competition, 
the private residential property development market can be described as oligopoly market. As 
mentioned by Wong (1993), the property market cycles tend to be fairly long and correct 
decisions made at a particular point in the property market cycle can give a developer a huge 
advantage to build a large market share that will be difficult for others to challenge until the 
next property cycle.  
 
However, despite the apparent evidence of the high concentration of market shares in the 
industry, the above mentioned investigation finds no conclusive evidence on the availability 
of economic profits to the developers, but indeed shows there may have a lack of threat from 
potential market entrants (Fu & Ching 2001). Wong (1993) and Wong et al (1996) also argued 
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that the property market cannot be said not competitive solely due to its high concentration. 
However, they claimed there is the absence of artificial barriers in the property markets in 
Hong Kong. Clearly, there is discrepancy between researchers to define the barriers to entry 
for the market. As the report from Consumer Council (1996) has accounted for this problem, 
it mentioned that the government land policies and marketing strategies of the developers are 
the consequences lead to the mentioned market structure and the market power of the major 
developers since those policies and strategies created the entry barriers to the entrants. 
Therefore, the contestability test for the market will be carried out in the following section to 
examine whether the incumbents are lacking the threat from the potential market entrants.  
 
And for the problem of market power, Wong et al (1996) as well as Lui (1997 cited in Fu & 
Ching 2001) rejected the notion that the large developers in Hong Kong can manipulate price 
and extract monopoly rent, since they alleged that new supply is unlikely to influence the 
price of dwellings in well-developed urban areas where new supply would be merely a small 
fraction of the total supply in the overall market. On the other hands, empirical study 
suggested the market power of the established developers cannot be constrained by the entrant 
firms and the secondary market is not a close substitute to the new housing market (Mui 
1997). In addition, Ball (1999) suggested that the developers’ behavior play a part for the high 
housing market volatility. The new housing, though, is a minority of total sales in the housing 
market, its role in affecting the rate of price change is probably greater as it is the main source 
of additional supply. Also, Fu and Ching (2001) suggested that the developers in Hong Kong 
can actually exercise their market power and they pointed out the reason why others treated 
the developers as the price taker is entirely because of the FDW model, which was discussed 
in Chapter 2 suggested that the demand for the new building space is perfectly elastic, with 
price determined by the demand for the building stock.  
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From the literatures reviewed, it is observed that there is no consensus on the question that 
whether the market is competitive enough or not. Therefore, the following sections are 
conducted to analyze the contestability of this market and find out the reasons for the 
existence of this highly concentrated market. 
 
3.4. Contestability 
 
Renaud et al (1997) mentioned that the barriers to entry into all real estate market sectors in 
Hong Kong are high and rising. Among these barriers are extremely high level of capital 
required to bid for land, the prevalence of capital intensive high-rise technologies, and the 
need to finance large and mix-use projects. As a result the real estate development industry 
has become highly concentrated, but there are also increasing pressures towards further 
concentration in the industry. Mui (1997) also agreed to the claims that the limited supply of 
land and the marketing strategies of the developers leads to cost disadvantage to the entrants. 
 
As in a fully contestable market, all participants act in a fiercely competitive manner resulting 
in maximum efficiency with prices close to costs. Everyone is absolutely free for entry and 
costless to exit. That means the entrants need not incur any costs that are not are incurred by 
the firm already insides the market. However, if the market is not contestable, there is no 
threat of new entrants to the market and high market concentration would be resulted, and 
there is also a risk of abuse of market power. In order to investigate how far it was contestable, 
two important aspects will be considered, which include: 1) accessibility to the land markets, 
as it is the indispensible resource to carry out property developments and 2) dominant 
developers’ strategies, to see whether these aspects allow incumbent firms to earn 
above-normal profits without the threat of entry and place entrants at a competitive 
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disadvantage.  
 
3.4.1. The Land Market in Hong Kong 
 
Land is the indispensable resource for the property market and as mentioned before, it has a 
direct influence to the housing market. Fu and Ching (2001) argued that the market power of 
developers derives not from their monopoly in the market for building space but from their 
monophony in the market for developable land. The market for building space is thick and 
individual developers are unlikely to have influence on the market prices. In contrast, the 
market for developable land is thin and well-capitalized developers may well be able to 
influence the prices at which they procure their landholdings. They found that the developers 
are able to earn economic profits from land acquisition at public land auctions in Hong Kong 
due to the entry barriers. Such market power has important consequences for the housing and 
building costs and provides a disincentive for the developers to acquire and develop land at 
socially efficient level, thus reducing the elasticity of housing and building supply in Hong 
Kong.  
 
However, Wong (1993) argued that since the land is supplied through public auctions or in the 
open market, therefore, it demonstrated that there is free entry. Also, the allegation for the 
huge auctioned lot sizes that favour well-capitalized developers are invalid as they explained 
that the small developers can still joining forces to bid for large lots and developing them 
together.   
 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the situation of the land market so as to facilitate the 
analysis of the private residential property development market structure. First, sources of 
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land supply are going to be introduced. And then, as the government is the sole supplier of 
almost all the lands in Hong Kong, it can dominantly control the amount and time of land 
supply for housing development. Therefore, the following will look at how the government 
regulatory arrangement affects the private residential property development market, especially 
how those policies favour the large share developers. 
 
3.4.1.1. Five channels of land disposal 
 
The major sources of land for new housing developers are new towns, reclamation, as well as 
urban renewal and redevelopment. Since 80% of the 1092 square kilometers of land is 
mountainous, land supply in Hong Kong is very restricted. In 1997, around 60% of the 
population lived in only around 80 square kilometers of land that is extremely densely 
developed (Renaud et al 1997). As nearly all lands in Hong Kong are held under leasehold 
system, the government is the sole supplier of the new developable land. And the time and 
amount of new residential land for sale are solely decided by the Housing, Planning and 
Lands Bureau in each year, while the Lands Department will carry out the process by 
publishing the timetable for annual Land Sale Programme. Thereafter, the new land is usually 
leased out in three methods, i.e. public auction, public tender and private treaty grant. Besides 
the new developable land, developers can obtain land by redevelopment of existing lands or 
through the land exchange of Letter A/B entitlements before July 1997. 
 
In public auction, the land lease is sold to the highest bidder and this method is the main 
source of government land disposal. And for public tender, it is mainly for those lands with 
restricted use or the sale is unlikely to attract general interest. Also for the place where the 
Government wishes to examine in advance detailed proposal for the development of a 
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particular lot, public tender will be carried out. In 1999, the Application System was 
introduced for the public auction. Under the system, the Lands Department will publish a list 
of sites available for sale upon application (‘the Application List’). It contains information on 
lot number, location, use, site area, and the estimated earliest available date for each of the 
sites. Interested parties could then apply for the sale of the sites from the Lands Department 
with the indication of the “minimum price” that they are prepared to bid. If the “minimum 
price” is accepted, the particular sites will then be disposed through public auction or tender. 
The Application System is well accepted by many people in the private property market since 
it was introduced because it can give flexibility to the land sale programme by allowing the 
market to determine the timing, amount and type of land required in the territory (HPLB 
2003). And since 2004, all the new land is only supplied through the Application system.  
 
Government disposes land in the form of a private treaty grant (PTG) through a direct grant 
for specified purposes, only under exceptional circumstances when doing so is in line with 
established Government policies with justifications, and meets the economic, social and 
community needs.  
 
Besides bidding the government disposal lands, developers can obtain lands by cumulatively 
purchasing the old buildings with redevelopment potential from the private sector. They can 
also jointly develop with the Land Development Corporation before 1999, which was 
reformed to Urban Renewal Authority since 1999. However, redevelopments is quite difficult 
to be carried out in Hong Kong since the acquisition of the land ownership rights is 
complicated, costly and time is required in order to acquire only a small land lot. 
 
Also, developers can exchange lands through letters A/B entitlements, which were issued by 
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the Hong Kong Government between January 1960 and March 1983 as an alternative to cash 
compensation when private land was to be resumed in the New Town Development Areas of 
the New Territories. They are essentially a government promissory note in respect of a future 
grant of land. The terms of each Letter A/B document confer upon the holder an entitlement at 
an unspecified future date, to a grant of building land by exchange at the ratio specified in the 
document. However, all the outstanding commitments for Letters A/B would be cleared by 
June 1997, by 1995, the vast majority of the outstanding Letters A/B were in the hands of four 
major developers and in order to meet their deadline, the government negotiated directly with 
the big four developers and three land exchanges were executed in early 1997 which absorbed 
all their outstanding holdings amounted to about 1.5 million sq. ft.  
 
Although there are numerous ways for developers to obtain developable lands, public auction 
is the most efficient method for developers which do not possess sufficient land banks. Also, 
as mentioned before, the public auction is open for all the developers, in the research by Tse, 
Hui and Chan (2001), but they found out that land market in Hong Kong is also highly 
concentrated, with a small group of companies dominating a large volume of land resources, 
the situation haven’t changed even after the implementation of the Application System in 
1999. However, their results come as a surprise that the leading property developers were not 
actively participate in the land auction market and therefore did not hold largest share of land 
from land auction.  
 
Eva Lee, the property analyst at ING Barings, raised out the causes of this situation is that 
“the Hong Kong’s top developers have bargaining power and pricing power in terms of 
buying land”. For example, Sun Hung Kai has a big stock of farmland acquired cheaply years 
ago for conversion to residential use, and is big enough to participate in the major property 
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sales that Hong Kong’s government organizes by tender. Cheung Kong can get a place in a 
consortium to bid on valuable land when he needs it, without having to hold excess assets 
(The Asian Wall Street Journal 2002 cited in Fu & Ching 2004). 
 
Moreover, compare with other countries around the world, the land prices in Hong Kong are 
extremely high which normally constituted 70 to 80 percent of the sales value of the 
completed flats (Fu & Ching 2004). Therefore, for a real estate development, developers 
require a huge capital outlay and time commitment to secure the financing of the land 
acquisition and construction works.  
 
From the land sales record during 1999 to 2007 (Appendix 3), there were totally 70 land lots 
to be auctioned. Within these, 43 lots are having more than 100,000 sq. ft. (as 
100,000-1,000,000 sq. ft. is generally regarded as medium size lots) of buildable area, of 
which only 3 lots have more than 1,000,000 sq. ft. (which is regarded as large scale lots). Also, 
32 records of winning amount were more than 500 millions. It is easily to observe that several 
developers, especially Sino group, actively participated in the land auctions and they 
dominated the land auction markets as they are more cash-rich than the smaller developers.  
 
Combined with the above findings of the land sales, it is observed that that the government as 
the monopolist on the supply of land is one of the consequences that lead to the high 
concentration in the land market as it established the barriers to entry, in terms of capital 
requirement and cost disadvantage, to the small developers and the potential entrants. This 
means that under this land disposal system, the large developers are more favorable than those 
small developers.   
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3.4.1.2. Housing Policies 
 
The Hong Kong Government has, over the years, intervened extensively in the housing sector, 
despite its well-known reputation as being one of the most ‘laissez faire’ market economies in 
the world. Besides the restriction on supply of residential lands, there were intervention 
measures include provision of public housing and rent control in some years. As a result, 
housing prices are influenced to a significant degree by the government policy (Chan et al 
2001).  
The Sino-British Joint Declaration was created to address the concerns of those properties 
where leases expired on 30 June 1997. The Joint Declaration emphasized the importance of 
land issues in Hong Kong by establishing new policies for those leases expiring on or before 
the eve of the hand-over. Within the policy, a controversial issue pertaining to the amount of 
new land granted to 50 ha per year was viewed as a constraint on land supply.  
 
However, because of the growing population, there was a huge demand on housing. Hong 
Kong government takes measures such as increasing development density to mitigate housing 
shortages. There was a flaw in the 50 ha quota policy which stated the quota in terms of land 
area rather than gross floor area. As a result, the Lands Department could make use of this 
loophole to release land of high density, because such land will use up less of the allowed 
quota, yet giving a higher gross floor area.  
 
However, this attempt also creates a social impact of congestion. In order to control this 
situation, the government regularly conducts studies on the housing circumstances in Hong 
Kong, for example, the Task Force Report on Land Supply and Property Prices in 1994 which 
aimed to cool the frenzied property market; Homes for Hong Kong People into the 21st 
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Century in 1998 and Better Housing for All in 1999. And during 1997, the pledge to build at 
least 85000 flats per year was implemented. The Hong Kong government made a commitment 
in its 1997 Policy Address to dispose of more land devoted to housing development to 
alleviate the housing shortage problem due to the population growth. The target consists of 
50000 public housing/subsidized flats and 35000 private flats per annum. However, this 
policy created pressure on developers to auction or tender for land or utilize area in their land 
bank to produce the target figure.  
 
The actual completion and construction of the private residential units from 1997-2007 was 
shown in Figure 3.3. It is observed that during 1998-2000, the amount of actual construction 
pushed up to more than 30000 units per year.  
 
Figure 3.3 Actual Completion and Actual Construction of private housing units, 
1997-2007 
 
(Source: Property Reviews, Buildings Department) 
 
However, the 85000 housing policy triggered the rapid downturn in the property prices as 
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shown in the Figure 3.4. Therefore, in 2002, the government imposed several policies, namely 
the nine-point plan, including the withdrawal from the role of property developer by halting 
the production and sale of public subsidized flats, thereby minimizing its intervention in the 
market in order to maintain a fair and stable environment to enable the sustained and healthy 
development of the private property market. And the Housing Authority also suspended the 
sale of the unsold and returned HOS flats as subsidized housing before the end of 2006 
(HPLB 2003). 
 
Figure 3.4 Price Indices for Hong Kong Property Market, 1995-2008 
 
(Source: Rating and Valuation Department, 2008) 
 
The government realized that land supply should be determined by market demand and to 
solve the situation that housing supply in excess the demand. As a result, they stopped the 
scheduled land auctions and suspended the Application List System until the end of 2004. 
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This action leaded to the decrease in the supply of new private flats after 2002 (HPLB 2003). 
Also, in order to deal with the large number of new flats that would be completed in the short 
term, extension of the period of the building covenants of development projects which 
originally will expire between 1 November 2003 and 31 October 2004 for one year was 
granted without additional charges. As subject to the conditions of individual sites, building 
covenants lasting three to five years are normally given. A developer is required to complete 
the development of a site within the prescribed period after acquiring site or modification to 
the land lease. This measure provided the developers with flexibility in adjusting the 
completion dates of their development projects according to market situation before offering 
them for sale (HPLB 2003). 
 
The nine-point plan was considered one that favoured the developer conglomerates as the 
plan provided a temporary window for the wealthy developers to unload their inventories and 
get their cash back. Also, by placing a one-year moratorium on land sales, government did a 
disservice to smaller property players with small land banks who would have been able to 
boost their land banks at cheaper costs in the then depressed market without government’s 
intervention (Poon 2006). 
 
Observed from the past to recent policies, the large developers do have several advantages 
over those small developers. Besides their well-capitalized structures enable them to obtain 
the lands with high prices whenever they desired, Poon (2006) commented that the rise of 
those large developers owes a lot to a government that adopts a laissez-faire approach where 
it so suits them and at the same time actively protects their interests. They have always had 
government on their side, whether under British or Chinese sovereignty, as being the sole 
supplier of the land in Hong Kong, the government has a vested interest in the property sector 
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through the receipt of revenue from land sales and land premiums on lease modification.  
 
3.4.2. Developers’ market behavior 
 
Although the uniqueness of the nature of Hong Kong residential property market structure in 
Hong Kong, the developers’ market behavior is quite similar around the world. In United 
Kingdom, Ball (1999) conducted a study concerning the British housing development 
industry and he found out that the market contexts for the developers operate severely 
constrain their behaviors and this structural constraint together with the profit-maximizing 
nature of firm and inter-firm competition lead to simple firm strategies as follows:  
 
1. Concerning production: use traditional and flexible methods and building types; 
2. In relation to the housing market: identify and operate in the most profitable market 
segments and adopt procyclical pricing; and  
3. With respect to the land market: adopt the most appropriate land banking and planning 
permission strategies in relation to market segments and regions of operation. 
 
These strategies are low cost, apart from land holdings, and have the advantage of requiring 
minimal sophistication and forecasting ability. He also argued that developers place great 
importance on the workings of the land market, and on the state of their own land banks as 
over-building and optimistic land purchases are prime causes of house building failures. 
Moreover, the variability of land prices is more likely to fluctuate in line with firms’ current 
development profits, which themselves are highly volatile. Therefore, that’s why the 
developers are so focused on land markets and their own land banks. Study for Vancouver 
carried out by Goldberg and Daniel (1976) supported Ball’s views on the residential 
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developer behavior. They pointed out that developers are primarily involved in the 
development of residential property and rely on this activity to generate profit. The high cost 
of land in conjunction with limited capital reserves and high financing cost make land 
banking an uncertain and high risk undertaking. Also, they are most concerned with factors 
affecting their development costs and place less emphasis on variables that affect the ultimate 
value of their product. 
 
For the Hong Kong developers, they have some similar behaviors as those in other parts in the 
world. From the literatures reviewed, most of their market behaviors are summarized as 
follows. 
 
3.4.2.1. Land Bank and Pricing strategies 
 
As discussed before, large developers are in favor of holding a sufficient amount of land bank. 
And because of the reasons, they can impose some marketing strategies to reduce the threat of 
potential entrants. From the research of Lai and Wang (1999) as well as Poon and Chan 
(1998), they found out the following observations. When during the market boom times, large 
developers raise the housing supply as they can have efficient control for the timing of their 
launch schedules. And also, they price their properties by the buyer-based approach, which 
means marketers will try to find out the perceived values that the potential customers will 
assign to their products. While during the slump periods, those large developers delay their 
schedules to maximize the selling price and price their properties in competition-based 
pricing approach, which means marketers will set prices largely based on competitors’ prices. 
These strategies reduce the threat of the potential entrants. 
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3.4.2.2. Sales techniques 
 
Developers adapted their business strategies to suit the market climate. They competed 
fiercely among one another at times, for example in bidding for building lots, especially when 
the market was rising. However, Consumer Council’s report (1996) suggested that they rarely 
competed head-on when selling their flats. They avoided clashes among themselves with sales 
techniques such as alternating sales of properties on competing sites and releasing completed 
flats in small batches. By releasing flats in batches, developers were able to test the market’s 
reaction and price-discriminate their customers. They also restricted supply by retaining units 
for internal sales and deferring public sales. Such practices would have been difficult to 
sustain in a market where there was a real threat of new entrants. 
 
3.4.2.3. Development Scale 
 
In Hong Kong, the technology and organization utilized in the development and construction 
process is essentially the same across the various land uses, namely high-rise scale-intensive 
projects with high technology content and capital-intensive supply processes (Renaud et al 
1997). This is a unique character of Hong Kong real estate economies apart from the others in 
the world. Therefore, large-scale private residential developments are commonly found in 
Hong Kong.  
 
According to Lee (1985), there is no agreed definition on the term “Large-scale private 
residential development”. Basically, large-scale private residential development can be 
broadly divided into two categories, the comprehensively planned and non-comprehensively 
planned. The former are those with the provision of a wide range of social and recreational 
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facilities, while the latter are provided with limited facilities. There are the common features 
of the large-scale private residential development. They are usually comprise of more than 10 
blocks of high-rise residential buildings with more or less the same architectural design and 
arranged in an orderly way to give a uniform appearance. They can usually provide more than 
a thousand of shelters to the market and accommodate a population more than 10000 or above 
for a development project.  
 
From the statistics (Table 3.2) for the large-scale private residential development, based on 
the above definitions, it is found that the large developers dominate this type of development. 
Together with the study of Tse, Hui and Chan (2001), they found that the large developers 
tend to dominate with the medium and large-scale lots, while small developers only held 9% 
of the market. It can be suggested those large developers locate themselves in a suitable 
market position or strategic domain to sustain their competitiveness by increasing their 
market share.  
Table 3.2 
Statistics of developers’ participation in Large-scale private residential development 
during 1991-2006 
 
Developers 
Participate in projects with 
More than 10 blocks More than 2000 units 
SHK 10 12 
CK 11 11 
Henderson 8 9 
Sino 5 5 
NWD 4 5 
Wheelock 0 2 
Hang Lung 0 0 
Kerry 0 3 
(Source: Various Annual Reports, Centadata) 
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High project costs and high liquidity position for acquiring land at short notice without 
unacceptable financial risk associated to the large scale development projects constitute to the 
growth of large developers. Developers need to have good access to capital. Thus they must 
have excellent business relationships with the financial community, so that they can have 
financial flexibility to secure at short notice suitable developable land for future development. 
For those larger developers, they maintain conservative financial structures and generally are 
cash-rich. The ability of these large developers enable them to bid for large land lots and 
allows them to develop mixed-use properties in prime locations with substantial positive 
internalized economies. Usually most final users are typically willing to pay higher prices for 
units in a large and comprehensively planned development with considerable internal 
economies and amenities. Therefore, developing at scale and internalize the consumer 
preferences are advantage that sets large developers aside from small developers, who 
routinely have to rely on redevelopment opportunities and discontinuous business 
circumstances associated there with (Renaud et al 1997). 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
After reviewing those literatures and statistics concerning the private residential property 
development market, it is obvious that the market is highly concentrated which majority of 
the market share are in hand of those large developers. The consequence of this market 
structure is the low contestability of the property development market.  
 
Due to the land tenure system in Hong Kong, the government is having the monopolistic 
power over the land market. Its regulatory arrangements (especially land policies) greatly 
influence the property market and make the market less contestable than other places in the 
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world. It is found that the government policies are in favour of the large developers and 
facilitated them to maintain their market shares. Developers’ strategies also constitute to the 
low contestability market, as their price strategies and scale developments, on one hand, can 
deter the incentive of the potential entrants due to the large developers’ advantage in term of 
costs and product differentiation. And, on the other hand, these can maintain their market 
share and strengthen their market powers.  
 
One point to note is that the large-scale developments do act as the barrier to entry to the 
small developers since it is observed that during the past 16 years, those developers with large 
market share dominated this sector of development and in turn maintain their market position.  
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Chapter 4 
Methodology and Data 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the reasons for why the large Hong Kong private 
residential developers tend to develop large-scale developments. From the previous chapters, 
the private residential property development market structure and theoretical literatures 
concerning the market share and profitability relationship have been reviewed. Therefore, 
several hypotheses have been adopted to carry out further investigation.  
 
Moreover, in order to investigate the variability of theses proposition, in the methodology 
section, the rationale for the analysis will be discussed. And, our adopted analysis method, 
One-Way ANOVA, will be introduced and the variables to be included in the model are also 
needed to be clearly defined to facilitate the data collection process. In addition, the expected 
results will be stated in order to compare with the empirical results. 
 
4.2. Propositions 
 
The following core propositions reflect the economic structure within which the large Hong 
Kong private residential developers develop large-scale developments conduct business. 
 
1. Large developers can sustain their large market share in the private residential property 
market under regulatory arrangements. 
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2. Large-scale developments act as a barrier to entry to new entrants and small developers;  
3. The market share of the developers has a positive relationship with their profitability. 
The propositions are subjected to further investigation in the following chapters so as to 
verify if they are supportable or not. 
 
4.3. Methodology 
 
The analysis for the above propositions is divided into several stages and described as follows. 
Some of these stages have been discussed in the previous chapters: 
 
Proposition 1: Large developers can sustain their large market share in the private 
residential property market under regulatory arrangements. 
In Chapter 3, the investigation of proposition 1 consists of 2 stages as follows: 
  
Stage 1: Desk research will be carried out by using published secondary sources of data to 
analyze the private residential market structure during 1991-2006, therefore the degree of 
market competition and market concentration can be assessed. In addition, literatures about 
the demand and supply of the housing market will be mentioned. Therefore, reader can be 
more familiar with the whole market situation. 
 
Stage 2: Large developers have continuously attained relatively large market shares in the 
private residential market as shown in the analysis before. The study will investigate the 
market structure to consider its contestability. As in a fully contestable market, all participants 
act in a fiercely competitive manner resulting in maximum efficiency with prices close to 
costs. However, if the market is not contestable, there is no threat of new entrants to the 
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market and high market concentration would be resulted, and there is also a risk of abuse of 
market power. The contestability analysis confined to two aspects. First, in order to 
investigate the influence of the regulatory arrangement (especially the land policies) on 
market share, studies on those regulatory arrangements will be carried out. If it is shown that 
those arrangements favor the large developers, the result can help explain why large 
developers hold large market share for many years.  
 
Proposition 2: Large-scale developments act as a barrier to entry to new entrants and 
small developers. 
The second issue for the contestability test is the developers’ market behavior. In the later part 
of Chapter 3, in order to achieve the objective of demonstrating that large-scale developments 
act as a barrier to entry to the new entrants and small developers, the nature of large-scale 
developments will be examined. In addition, statistics concerning the large-scale private 
residential developments during 1991-2006 will be provided. If there was a trend that the 
large-scale developments were mainly provided by the top-tier developers, the proposition 
can be justified.  
 
Proposition 3: The market share of the developers has a positive relationship with their 
profitability. 
In Chapter 5, an empirical test will be conducted to investigate the relationship between 
market share and the profitability of the developers, ANOVA method is to be used. In the 
analysis, the selected developers are divided into two groups, large market share and small 
market share. The proposition can be supported if it shown that evidence is found that the 
market share did have positive influence to the profitability. 
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4.4. One-Way ANOVA (One between-subject ANOVA) 
 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a technique originally developed by Fisher (1925). Its 
purpose is to predict a single dependent variable on the basis of one or more predictor 
(independent) variables, and to establish whether those predictors are good predictors. It can 
deals with tests concerning two or more population means. By using the ANOVA test, the 
hypothesis to be tested is that the different sample means come from the same population. 
 
In the following sections, the methodology of computing the statistics used in the tests and the 
testing procedure as well as the assumptions made will be discussed. 
 
4.4.1. Assumptions of the One-way ANOVA 
The Analysis of Variance method has the following assumptions:  
1. The standard deviations (SD) of the populations for all groups are equal (the 
homogeneity of variance).  
i.e. σL2 = σS2 = σe2 
The term σe2, where e stands for error, represents the error variance – the variance 
unrelated to any group differences.  
2. The structural model is an accurate description of the data in this case, that only one 
factor influences the data systematically, and the residual variability represents 
random error. 
3. The error is normally distributed within each group (assumption of normal 
distribution of error). 
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4. Independence of error components: the error components (εij) are independent, or 
uncorrelated.  
 
4.4.2 The Empirical Model 
Rij = μ + αi + εij 
Rij represent the annual return on assets of the j firms in group i 
μ represent the overall mean annual return on assets 
μi represent the mean of annual return on assets in group i 
αi represent the degree to which the mean of group i deviates from the overall mean. So αi 
represents the contribution of group i, i.e. αi = μi – μ 
εij represents the amount by which firm j in group i deviates from the mean of its group (the 
‘error’ or ‘uniqueness’ of firm j in group i), i.e. εij = Rij - μi 
 
4.4.3. The Null Hypothesis 
 
We will test the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the various groups. The 
null hypothesis can be stated like this: 
Ho: μL = μS = μ 
In other words, the null hypothesis is that all means are equal to each other and the grand 
mean (μ) and that all group effects are zero: that is αL = αS = 0 
 
4.4.4 The Computation for ANOVA 
 
The methodology of ANOVA is a very straightforward computation procedure involving 
computation of means and variances. The aim of these statistical data is to test the null 
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hypothesis by the use of F-Test which requires the computation of the variation between 
groups (SSB) and the variation within each group (SSW). And as the ratio of the variation 
between columns to the variation with columns follows the F-distribution, which varies 
according to the number of degrees of freedom, therefore, it is required to determine the 
number of degrees of freedom for SSB, SSW and SST. After that the analysis of variance 
table can be created and the F-value can be found out which shows the result that whether our 
hypothesis is accept or not. There are several terms will be clarified further to facilitate a 
thorough understanding of the use of analysis of variance method in this study. 
 
4.4.4.1 Between group variation and Within group variation 
 
The between group variation is measured by the between-group sum of squares as follow: 
 
While the within-group variation can be found in a similar manner as follow: 
 
where xij means the individual value for firm j in group i. 
 
4.4.4.2 F-statistics and its Components 
 
F-distribution is a ratio of two variances and it varies according to the number of degrees of 
freedom. The use of the F-statistics is to test the hypothesis that the examined two variances 
are equal and therefore, the expected F-value should be equal to 1. If the variances are equal, 
the F-value will be equal to unity. The critical F-statistic found in the F-table allows 
acceptance of the hypothesis of equality in spite of reasonable variation from unity which 
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commonly assume a 5-percent risk level. It means that a certain amount of variation from 
unity may be due to chance. If the variation is greater than that allowed, the hypothesis is 
rejected.  
 
In this analysis of variance, we are comparing the mean square between to the mean square 
within. Using this method, the difference between means can be tested, because the mean 
square within a particular group is the variation due to chance while the mean square between 
variations is variation due to chance plus variation due to the different group. If the ratio were 
equal to unity, the variation due to different group would be equal to 0.  
 
 
 
Therefore the ratio of the chance variation would be equal to unity. As the variation due to the 
different group increases, the value of F also increases. If this computed value exceeded the 
critical F-value for the appropriate number of degrees of freedom and the risk level, the null 
hypothesis would be rejected.  
 
4.4.4.2.1 Degrees of freedom 
 
The number of independent pieces of observations that go into the estimate of a parameter is 
called the degrees of freedom (df). In general, the df of an estimate is the number of 
independent observations that go into the estimate, minus the number of parameters estimated 
from those observations as intermediate steps.  
 
The number of degrees of freedom is different for SSB, SSW and SST. The SSB has (k-1) 
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degrees of freedom while the SSW is determined by the total number of cells within the 
experiment and is equal to k(r-1). And then, the MSB and MSW can be determined by using 
the corresponding number of degrees of freedom to divide the SSB and SSW.  
 
4.4.4.2.2 p-value 
 
The p-values are usually used to show the chance that the estimated coefficient (αi) is equal to 
zero. Usually if it is shown that the chance of “αi equals to zero” is equal or lower than 5%, it 
is said that αi is significant at 5% level, which is commonly accepted as significant. The 
smaller the p-value is, the more significant the estimated coefficient is. 
 
4.5. Check assumptions of ANOVA 
 
If the populations from which data to be analyzed by a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) were sampled violate one or more of the one-way ANOVA test assumptions, the 
results of the analysis may be incorrect or misleading. Moreover, small or unbalanced sample 
sizes can also increase vulnerability to assumption violations. For our analysis, there may be 
the problems of heteroscedasticity and non-normality. 
 
4.5.1. Tests for homogeneity of variances (Heteroscedasticity) 
 
Levene’s Test is used to test if the samples have equal variances. ‘Equal variance across 
samples’ is called homogeneity of variance. It tests the null hypothesis that the population 
variances are equal. If the resulting p-value of the Levene’s test is less than the critical value 
(0.05), the obtained differences in sample variances are unlikely to have occurred based on 
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random sampling. Thus, the null hypothesis of equal variances is rejected and it is concluded 
that there is a difference between the variances in the population. Similarly, if the p-value is 
greater than the critical value, the variances are significantly homogeneous and we can then 
be confident about proceeding with the one-way ANOVA assuming equal variances. 
 
4.5.2. Test for the Normality Assumption 
 
One-Way ANOVA are not as sensitive to lack of normality of errors as they are to 
heterogeneity of variances. However, the test for homogeneity of variances is susceptible to 
lack of normality and so can give misleading results if errors are badly non-normal. For this 
reason it is essential to carry out test for this condition.  
 
The values in a sample may indeed be from the same population, but not from a normal one. 
Signs of non-normality are skewness (lack of symmetry) or light-tailedness or 
heavy-tailedness. In this study, One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test will be used to test 
for the normality of the data, which is a test for goodness of fit usually involves examining a 
random sample from some unknown distribution in order to test the null hypothesis that the 
unknown distribution function is in fact a known, specified function. The analysis will show 
an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) value, which is also known as the p-value, it tells the probability of 
getting the results if the null were actually true (i.e., it is the probability that would be in error 
if you rejected the null hypothesis). If the p-value is less than 0.05, you reject the normality 
assumption, and if the p-value is greater than 0.05, there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
the distribution is not normal (meaning that you can proceed with the assumption of 
normality), there is no reason to doubt the distribution is normal, so it is safely to proceed 
with the ANOVA analysis. 
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However, if there are only a small number of data points, non-normality can be hard to detect. 
If there are a great many data points, the normality test may detect statistically significant but 
trivial departures from normality that will have no real effect on the F statistic.  
The one-way ANOVA's F test will not be much affected even if the population distributions 
are skewed, but the F test can be sensitive to population skewness if the sample sizes are 
seriously unbalanced. If the sample sizes are not unbalanced, the F test will not be seriously 
affected by light-tailedness or heavy-tailedness, unless the sample sizes are small (less than 5), 
or the departure from normality is extreme.  
Moreover, the one-way ANOVA's F test is robust for validity against non-normality, but it 
may not be the most powerful test available for a given non-normal distribution, although it is 
the most powerful test available when its test assumptions are met. In the case of 
non-normality, a nonparametric test or employing a transformation may result in a more 
powerful test.  
4.6. Data Specifications 
 
In this section, it aims to provide a detailed account of the data used in this empirical study. 
The period of data used in this study is defined. Also, the definitions and sources of the proxy 
data for each variable are described. 
 
4.6.1. Period of Data 
 
The data used in this study is restricted to the period between 1995 and 2006, totaling 12 
years. It is the longest time period within which full data sets are available for the selected 
variables.  
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4.6.2. Definition and sources of data 
 
Below is a detailed account of the definitions and sources of the data for each variable. The 
quality and reliability of data has important implication for the validity of the empirical 
findings. All the data employed in this empirical analysis are publicly available information 
and collected from various authoritative sources- government websites and official 
publications. 
 
4.6.2.1. Market Share 
 
Table 4.1 List of Large Share Developers and Small Share Developers 
 
Large Share Developers (Group L) Small Share Developers (Group S) 
Stock 
Code 
Company Corresponding 
Market share 
Stock 
Code 
Company Corresponding 
Market share 
0001 Cheung Kong 
(Holdings) 
Limited 
25% 0017 New World 
Development 
6% 
0012 Henderson Land 
Development 
Company Limited 
19% 0101 Hang Lung 
Properties 
Limited 
6% 
0016 Sun Hung Kai 
Properties 
Limited 
30% 0049 Wheelock 
Properties (HK) 
Limited 
5% 
0083 Sino Group 8% 0683 Kerry Properties 
Limited 
2% 
 
The only independent variable used for this study analysis is the market share, which means 
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the corresponding market share of each developer in the new supply of the private residential 
property market among these 8 developers during the period between 1991 and 2006.And the 
findings are based on the information given in the respective annual reports. As illustrated in 
the Table 4.1, the 8 developers are divided into two groups, large share group (Group L) and 
the small share group (Group S), according to their market share.  
 
4.6.2.2. Profitability (Return on Assets) 
The dependent variable in this study is the profitability, which is the main index of the private 
firm’s economic performance. However, profitability is a matter of degree, not of absolute 
amounts. The simple total of dollar profits is not enough to show how profitable a firm is. 
Therefore, in this study, the rate of return on asset is used as the measurement of profitability, 
for that show how profitable a company's assets are in generating revenue.  
ROA can be computed as: 
ROA = Net income / Total Assets 
This number tells what the company can do with what it's got, i.e. how many dollars of 
earnings they derive from each dollar of assets they control. It's a useful number for 
comparing competing companies in the same industry. The number will vary widely across 
different industries. Return on assets gives an indication of the capital intensity of the 
company, which will depend on the industry. However, ROA cannot be directly obtained 
from the annual reports. Some simple calculations need to be involved and the fiscal 
information, net income and total assets, can be obtained from the profit and loss statement 
and balance sheet in the annual reports.  
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4.7. Limitation of the empirical study 
 
ANOVA test on the profitability rate for each year will be carried out. However, as there are 
only limited samples for carrying out these analyses, small sample sizes may increase 
vulnerability to assumption violations. Therefore, the entire annual profitability rate between 
1995 and 2006 will be used to conduct a single ANOVA test, and our analysis of the result 
will focus on this test. To summarize, there will be 13 tests, of which 12 tests will analyze 
performance for each year and with one using 12 years data. Descriptive statistics for the 
variables used are illustrated in the Table 4.2a and Table 4.2b. 
 
Table 4.2a Descriptive statistics for the ANOVA analysis, 1995-2006 
1995-2006 
  N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
Large 48 0.070351  0.054407  0.007853  0.000861  0.340972  
Small 48 0.035206  0.034536  0.004985  -0.050550  0.128316  
Total 96 0.052779  0.048648  0.004965  -0.050550  0.340972  
 
Table 4.2b Descriptive statistics for the ANOVA analysis for each year, 1995-2006 
1995 
  N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
Large 4 0.098402  0.060281  0.030140  0.0318 0.1762 
Small 4 0.038802  0.016184  0.008092  0.0154 0.0527 
Total 8 0.068602  0.051812  0.018318  0.0154 0.1762 
1996 
Large 4 0.087824  0.043873  0.021936  0.0385 0.144 
Small 4 0.042577  0.013579  0.006789  0.031 0.0587 
Total 8 0.065200  0.038586  0.013642  0.031 0.144 
1997 
Large 4 0.070850  0.063147  0.031574  0.0241 0.1639 
Small 4 0.037899  0.026039  0.013019  0.0186 0.0747 
Total 8 0.054374  0.048060  0.016992  0.0186 0.1639 
1998 
Large 4 0.055097  0.009405  0.004702  0.0413 0.0626 
Small 4 0.026954  0.020082  0.010041  0.0113 0.0535 
Total 8 0.041025  0.020905  0.007391  0.0113 0.0626 
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1999 
Large 4 0.125358  0.144260  0.072130  0.0363 0.341 
Small 4 0.019965  0.014459  0.007230  0.0017 0.0321 
Total 8 0.072662  0.110373  0.039023  0.0017 0.341 
2000 
Large 4 0.052412  0.037319  0.018659  0.0129 0.103 
Small 4 0.016482  0.013280  0.006640  0.0036 0.0341 
Total 8 0.034447  0.032269  0.011409  0.0036 0.103 
2001 
Large 4 0.028968  0.018266  0.009133  0.0063 0.049 
Small 4 0.014029  0.011421  0.005711  0.0044 0.0306 
Total 8 0.021499  0.016207  0.005730  0.0044 0.049 
2002 
Large 4 0.029080  0.016183  0.008092  0.0086 0.0442 
Small 4 -0.012764  0.038205  0.019103  -0.0506 0.0214 
Total 8 0.008158  0.035186  0.012440  -0.0506 0.0442 
2003 
Large 4 0.045320  0.014779  0.007390  0.0309 0.0658 
Small 4 0.041219  0.048243  0.024122  -0.0088 0.0977 
Total 8 0.043269  0.033104  0.011704  -0.0088 0.0977 
2004 
Large 4 0.08706  0.02396  0.01198  0.052 0.1037 
Small 4 0.07447  0.04492  0.02246  0.0241 0.1283 
Total 8 0.08077  0.03400  0.01202  0.0241 0.1283 
2005 
Large 4 0.086968  0.017586  0.008793  0.0647 0.1076 
Small 4 0.059044  0.034062  0.017031  0.0093 0.0862 
Total 8 0.073006  0.029199  0.010323  0.0093 0.1076 
2006 
Large 4 0.078729  0.006683  0.003341  0.0724 0.0862 
Small 4 0.064596  0.030996  0.015498  0.0299 0.092 
Total 8 0.071663  0.022090  0.007810  0.0299 0.092 
 
4.8. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, three propositions have been built up according to the previous reviews on the 
literatures and established the methodology to investigate the validity of the propositions. 
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One-way ANOVA model and details of the data used in the empirical analysis have also been 
introduced which will be used to empirically examine the market share and profitability 
relationship in the private residential property development market. Next chapter will present 
the model adopted and results in this study. 
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Chapter 5 
Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the results of the ANOVA study will be shown and illustrated. The 
significance of the model and the selected variables will also be verified. After that, a 
comprehensive analysis will be given to the results of the empirical study. Finally, the 
implications of this empirical study will be presented. 
 
5.2. Analysis of the Empirical Results 
 
With the help of computer statistical tools, the results of the ANOVA model are produced 
after computing all the required data. The results of this ANOVA analysis are shown in Table 
5.1.  
 
As refer to Table 5.1, although the results are not significant (p-value is higher than the 
critical value, 0.05) for the ANOVA analyses of each year, from 1995 to 2006. However, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, there are only eight samples for carrying out analysis for 
each year. Therefore, their explanatory powers are not high as small sample sizes may 
increase vulnerability to assumption violations. Therefore, the entire annual profitability rates 
between 1995 and 2006 have been used to conduct a single ANOVA test. Table 5.4 shows that 
full result of this ANOVA analysis.  
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Table 5.1 The Summarized ANOVA Results 
 
Test of Homogeneity of 
Variances 
Test of Normality 
(One-Sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov) 
ANOVA 
 
Levene 
Statistic 
Sig. Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) F-value Sig. 
1995 3.041 0.132 0.719 3.647 0.105  
1996 2.352 0.176 0.931 3.883 0.096  
1997 2.384 0.174 0.617 0.931 0.372  
1998 2.811 0.145 0.814 6.443 0.044  
1999 6.93 0.039 0.138 2.114 0.196  
2000 1.619 0.25 0.839 3.291 0.120  
2001 1.118 0.331 0.745 1.924 0.215  
2002 27.11 0.002 0.68 4.068 0.090  
2003 9.428 0.022 1 0.026 0.876  
2004 2.105 0.197 0.771 0.245 0.638  
2005 1.518 0.264 0.636 2.122 0.195  
2006 32.326 0.001 0.64 0.795 0.407  
1995-2006 1.614 0.207 0.201 14.277 0.000  
(Numbers in Bold type mean the corresponding result is insignificant) 
 
Table 5.2 Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
RETURN ON ASSETS 
Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 p-value. 
1.614 1 94 0.207 
 
From the result of the Levene test (Table 5.2), the resulting p-value is greater than the critical 
value (0.05), the variances are significantly homogeneous and it is confident that the analysis 
is proceeding with the assumption of equal variances. For the test for normality, One-Sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, the result has been shown in Table 5.3. Since the value of Asymp. 
Sig. (2-tailed) is greater than the critical value (0.05), there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
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the distribution is not normal. The assumption of normality is, therefore, not violated and 
together with the homogeneity of variance, they support the proceeding ANOVA test has a 
stronger explanatory power as the test assumptions are met. 
 
Table 5.3 One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
  RETURN ON ASSETS 
N 96 
Normal Parameters(a,b) 
Mean 5.28E-02 
Std. 
Deviation
4.86E-02 
Most Extreme Differences 
Absolute 0.109 
Positive 0.103 
Negative -0.109 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.071 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.201 
a Test distribution is Normal. 
b Calculated from data. 
 
Therefore, it is believed that the ANOVA model has a good overall fit since it does not violate 
the assumptions specified in Chapter 4, namely the homogeneity of variances and normality 
of data.  
Table 5.4 The ANOVA Result of 1995-2006 
 
Moreover, having a high F-statistic of 14.277 indicates the probability to accept the null 
RETURN ON ASSETS 
  
Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean Square F p-value. 
Between 
Groups 
0.02965 1 0.02965  14.277 0.000  
Within 
Groups 
0.195 94 0.00208      
Total 0.225 95       
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hypothesis is extremely low. Also, through observing the p-value in Table 5.4, the 
significance of the analysis that market share has effect on the profitability rate has been 
supported. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the coefficient is generally accepted as significant if 
its p-value is smaller or equal to 0.05, which is said to be significant at the 5% level. In this 
study, the standard of “significance” of results is set at this 5% level. Therefore, the analysis 
shows that market share has significant effects on the profitability rates of the developers. 
The explanation to this result will be discussed in the later part.  
 
5.3. Implications of Findings 
 
This section attempts to explain the impacts of market share on profitability of developers in 
Hong Kong. From the previous ANOVA analysis, it showed that the profitability of the 
developers, who attained a relative high market share developers, are different from those 
only have small share and by observing their group means, the large share group has a higher 
mean than the small share group. Therefore, it can be said that market share of developers 
have a positive relationship with their profitability.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the private residential property market is not very contestable and 
highly concentrated. According to the theoretical explanations mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
relationship between market share and profitability can be explained by any one of the three 
theories, namely the Efficiency Theory, Market Power Theory and Product Quality 
Assessment Theory. 
 
Based on the definition of the efficiency theory, the large developers do possess the benefit of 
economies of scale in several ways. First, as shown in Chapter 3 that large-scale development 
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is dominated by those large developers, though this kind of development project carries a 
greater risk, the developers can benefit from the economies of scale in large project (Chau 
1995 cited in Renaud 1997) and receive a relatively higher return to compensate the risk. 
Therefore, the large-scale development projects warranted a proportionate yield to those who 
invested in them (Tse et al 2001).  
 
Also, observing from the pricing and sales behaviors, economies of learning and experience 
allow the large developers to gain advantages over the small developers and entrants. With 
larger market share, they have more experience than those small developers in selling and 
pricing their properties under different economic environment, therefore, their decision 
making skills would be better.  
 
Also, after the analysis of the contestability of the private residential property market, it is no 
doubt that large developers can exert their market power to affect the property development 
market in order to maximize their benefits since the market is not contestable enough. Their 
sizes and importance in the market enable them to obtain inputs such as land resources and 
capital financing at a favorable position e.g. land bank or lower financing costs, which have 
been discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, they can set prices rather than being a price taker 
especially during the boom time, it is because they have the bargaining power over the buyers 
as most of the housing supply is in the hand of those large developers.  
 
Large developers also provide people with a brand name effect. Since the market is under an 
uncertain and imperfect information environment about the product performance, their 
established brand names and reputations provide buyers a more superior quality than those of 
the smaller developers. Also, as the large developers are more cash-rich, they would put more 
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resource to their promotion, it can help building up their images for both the projects and 
firms, so that the consumers are more willing to spend more for the more promised 
high-quality units provided by the large developers. And product differentiation advantage 
provided by the large-scale development also allows the large developers to receive a high 
price as the consumers would like to pay a higher price for the units in the large-scale 
development projects which can provide with them more amenity and convenience services 
(Lai 1996). 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, this chapter has presented and interpreted the empirical results, regarding how 
market share of the developers affect their profitability. As the ANOVA analysis for 
profitability between large share developers and small share developers provided a significant 
result, it supported the proposition that market share of the developers has a positive 
relationship with their profitability.  
 
The result is important to developers, interested real estate investors as well as government 
bodies. These first two parties can thus evaluate their current strategies in order to maximize 
their profits and the government can see whether the current market structure is healthy to the 
whole society or not. And next chapter will come to the conclusion of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
6.1. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the market structure of the private residential 
property market as well as the behavior of those large developers in developing large-scale 
development in Hong Kong to investigate their relationship to the developers’ profitability.  
In particular, literatures together with the desk analysis have provided an extensive 
investigation to the private property development market. First of all, a highly concentrated 
market is found, inside which more than 60% of market share are held by the top nine 
developers and more than 50% are in the hand of top four developers during the period of 
1991-2006. And especially in 2006, 74% of new housing units are provided by those four 
developers, it shows the market is becoming more and more concentrated. It can be 
concluded that the private property development market is an oligopolistic market since after 
the in-depth discussion, a low contestability market is observed.  
 
Large developers can have advantages, in terms of costs and capital requirement, in obtaining 
lands from different channels. Furthermore, large developers usually have a huge amount of 
land bank, it enables them to maintain a smooth production schedule and determine their 
strategies which the small developers and the potential entrants cannot enjoy. Also, the capital 
requirement to enter the industry is high since the land costs in Hong Kong is relative high, it 
induced the financial risk to the small developers which are not so well-capitalized and less 
prone to get financial assistance than the larger developers.  
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In addition, barriers to entry to the property development market were found from the 
marketing strategies and pricing practices by the large developers, which lead to this low 
contestable market. As the former can maintain the developers’ market share and market 
power, the latter can deter the incentive of entrants as the developers can adopt a competitive 
pricing strategy when the market sentiment is bullish. Moreover, since from the statistics of 
the developer participation in large-scale developments, it is found that those large-share 
developers do dominate this sector of market. This kind of development can allow the large 
developers to enjoy the scale economies and product differentiation advantages from the 
others.  
 
Last but not least, the government regulatory arrangements concerning the housing and land 
matters in the past decades also constituted to the mention market structure. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, those large developers are more beneficial from the implementation of those 
policies than the small developers no matter how the market sentiment is. Therefore, the large 
developers can always maintain a relative high market position in the market. 
 
Moreover, the empirical model of this study has tested the relationship between market share 
and the developers’ profitability. A significant result was found which showed that market 
share do have a positive influence to the profitability. Therefore, it can be a signal for both 
government and the developers and they should take into account the market share effect 
when they are making decision for either land and housing policies or business strategies. 
 
6.2. Limitations of the study 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the limitation of the empirical study is the inadequacy of data. 
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The data used in the empirical model is inadequate in reflecting the real situation entirely. As 
the profitability rate can only be found out for those public listed property development 
company, there are still some private development company like Nan Fung and Chinachem 
Group which are also active participants in the private residential property development 
market, however, their information could not be included as they did not release any profit 
information out.  
 
Also, actually the ANOVA test on the profitability rate for each year should be carried out. 
However, small sample sizes may increase vulnerability to assumption violations. The entire 
annual profitability rates between 1995 and 2006 have be used to conduct a single ANOVA 
test, but there should be in reality some other factors influencing the profitability when a 
time-series of data is used.  
 
Therefore, it is suggested that if more development companies could be included in the future, 
this study is recommended to be carried out again. Also, it is also beneficial to the society that 
there are continuous researches on the private residential property market structure so as to 
monitor any change in situation and influences of policies from time to time. 
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Appendix 1: Development Details by Developers 
 
Developments of Sun Hung Kai Properties 
 
Year Development Name Location 
Group 
Interest 
(%) 
No. of 
Units 
Attributable 
Units to the 
Group 
1995 Stanford Villa 7 Stanley Village Road 20 72 14.4 
1995 Sea Crest Villa (Phases 2 & 3) 
Sham Tseng Lots 211 & 212 in 
DD 387 
100 868 868 
1995 Pristine Villa Sha Tin Town Lot 331 JV 498 498 
1995 Curio Court 20 Ping Hong Lane, Yuen Long 100 56 56 
1995 Aegean Villa 
Clearwater Bay Lot 333 in DD 
224 
100 12 12 
1995 Royal Ascot (Towers 1-7) Shatin Town Lot 411 JV 1224 1224 
1995 Europa Garden Kwu Tung Road, Sheung Shui 100 63 63 
1995 The Harbourview 11 Magazine Gap Road 50 51 25.5 
1995 Coronet Court 2 Hung Tai Road, Yuen Long 100 88 88 
  2932 2849 
  
1996 Palm Springs (Phases 1B-1E) Wo Shang Wai, Yuen Long 100 587 587 
1996 Meadowlands (Phases 1 & 2) 
Tan Kwai Tsuen Lot 4285 in DD 
124, Yuen Long 
100 488 488 
1996 Woodland Crest Fanling Sheung Shui Town Lot 36 60 548 328.8 
1996 Royal Palms Wo Shang Wai, Yuen Long 100 424 424 
1996 Royal Ascot (Towers 8-11) 1 Tsun King Road, Shatin JV 1280 1280 
1996 King's Park Villa 
1 King's Park Rise, Ho Man Tin, 
Kowloon 
90 359 323.1 
1996 Jasper Court Ma Fung Ling, Yuen Long 100 152 152 
1996 51 & 55 Deep Water Bay Road 51 & 55 Deep Water Bay Road 100 11 11 
1996 18 Tung Shan Terrace 18 Tung Shan Terrace 50 14 7 
  3863 3601 
 
1997 East Point City 
Chung Wah Road, Tseung Kwan 
O 
100 2184 2184 
1997 Villa Tiara Tuen Hing Road, Tuen Mun 100 556 556 
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1997 Parkside Villa 
23 Town Park Road South, Yuen 
Long 
100 350 350 
1997 Grand Del Sol  Yuen Long 85 1100 935 
1997 Royal Sea Crest Tsing Lung Tau 100 168 168 
1997 3 Repulse Bay Road 3 Repulse Bay Road 100 42 42 
1997 22 Tung Shan Terrace 22 Tung Shan Terrace 100 16 16 
   4416 4251 
  
1998 Le Palais 8 Pak Pat Shan Road, Tai Tam 100 34 34 
1998 Chateau Royale Tai Po Town Lot 142 100 68 68 
1998 Belair Monte 3 Ma Sik Road, Fanling 8 1680 134.4 
1998 Greenfields 1 Fung Kam Street, Yuen Long 7 480 33.6 
1998 Symphony Bay Sai Sha Road, Sai Kung 100 972 972 
1998 Botania Villa Tuen Mun 100 726 726 
1998 Chelsea Heights Tuen Mun 100 787 787 
1998 Villa Esplanada Phase 1  Tsing Yi 22.5 792 178.2 
  5539 2933 
 
1999 Castello 69 Siu Lek Yuen Road, Shatin 100 1744 1744 
1999 Scenic View 63 Fung Shing Street, Kowloon 100 1034 1034 
1999 Mount Haven 3 Liu To Road, Tsing Yi 100 816 816 
1999 
Tung Chung Crescent (Block 7 
to 9) 
Tung Chung Town Lots 1 & 2 20 991 198.2 
1999 
Grand Pacific Views & Grand 
Pacific Heights 
Castle Peak Road, Tuen Mun 100 856 856 
1999 Tung Chung Crescent Tung Chung Town Lot 1 20 1212 242.4 
1999 Waterfront South 1-5 Tue Wok Street, Aberdeen 100 235 235 
1999 Villa Esplanada Phase 2 8 Nga Ying Chau Street, Tsing Yi 22.5 832 187.2 
1999 Hillview Court Pak Shek Wo, Sai Kung 100 115 115 
 7835 5428 
 
2000 Royal Peninsula 3 Hung Lai Road, Kowloon 50 1669 834.5 
2000 Le Sommet 28 Fortress Hill Road, North Point 100 394 394 
2000 Villa Premiere 
99 Fung Cheung Road, Yuen 
Long 
100 320 320 
2000 Villa Esplanada Phase 3 8 Nga Ying Chau Street, Tsing Yi 22.5 1200 270 
2000 Chelsea Heights Phase 2 1 Shek Pai Tau Path, Tuen Mun 100 808 808 
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2000 The Belcher's Phase 1 
89 Pok Fu Lam Road, Western 
Mid-Levels 
29 1093 316.97 
2000 Grand Villa 401 Chatham Road, Hung Hom 100 40 40 
2000 Grand Horizon 11 Cheung Wan Street,Tsing Yi 85 1432 1217.2 
2000 Villa Claire 
18 Ming Yuen Western Street, 
North Point 
100 52 52 
 7008 4253 
 
2001 The Leighton Hill Inland Lot 8882, Happy Valley 100 552 552 
2001 The Parcville 
33 Yuen Long Kau Hui Road, 
Yuen Long 
66.7 1618 1079.206 
2001 Prima Villa 8 Chui Yan Street, Shatin 100 1024 1024 
2001 The Belcher's Phase 2 
89 Pok Fu Lam Road, Western 
Mid-Levels 
29 1121 325.09 
2001 Les Saisons 28 Tai On Street, Shaukeiwan 30 864 259.2 
2001 Oscar by the Sea Phase 1 Tseung Kwan O Town Lot 51 JV 424 424 
2001 Ocean Shores Phase 1 88 O King Road, Tseung Kwan O 49 1920 940.8 
 7523 4604 
 
2002 Park Island Phase 1 & 2 8 Pak Lai Road, Ma Wan JV 2571 2571 
2002 Park Central Phases 1 & 2 
Tseung Kwan O Town Lots 57 & 
66 
57.52 4152 2388.2304 
2002 Villa by the Park 139 Castle Peak Road, Yuen Long 100 828 828 
2002 Aegean Coast Tuen Mun Town Lot 374 25 1624 406 
2002 1 Po Shan Road 1 Po Shan Road, Mid-Levels 60 58 34.8 
2002 Kelletteria 71 Mt. Kellett Road, The Peak 100 4 4 
2002 Oscar by the Sea Phase 2 8 Pung Loi Road, Tseung Kwan O JV 1160 1160 
2002 Ocean Shores Phase 2 88 O King Road, Tseung Kwan O 49 1536 752.64 
2002 1 Lion Rock Road 1 Lion Rock Road, Kowloon 100 57 57 
 11990 8202 
 
2003 Liberte 
833 Lai Chi Kok Road, Cheung 
Sha Wan 
35.44 2439 864.3816 
2003 Ocean Shores Phase 3B 88 O King Road, Tseung Kwan O 49 768 376.32 
2003 Ocean Shores Phase 3A 88 O King Road, Tseung Kwan O 49 1504 736.96 
2003 Seaview Crescent Tung Chung Town Lot 3 20 1537 307.4 
 6248 2285 
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2004 18 Farm Road 18 Farm Road, Kowloon 100 320 320 
2004 YOHO Town Phase 1 8 Yuen Lung Street, Yuen Long 100 2201 2201 
2004 Sham Wan Towers 
3 Ap Lei Chau Drive, Ap Lei 
Chau 
100 1040 1040 
2004 BeneVille 18 Tuen Kwai Road, Tuen Mun 100 684 684 
2004 8 Waterloo Road 8 Waterloo Road, Tuen Mun JV 576 576 
2004 Vianni Cove 33 Tin Kwai Road, Tuen Mun 40 1091 436.4 
 5912 5257 
 
2005 The Arch  1 Austin Road West, Kowloon JV 1054 1054 
2005 Severn 8 8 Severn Road, The Peak 100 22 22 
2005 Park Island Phase 3 8 Pak Lai Road, Ma Wan JV 1451 1451 
2005 The Pacifica  
9 Sham Shing Road, Cheung Sha 
Wan 
50 2285 1142.5 
2005 Central Heights 
9 Tong Tak Street, Tseung Kwan 
O 
25 390 97.5 
 5202 3767 
 
2006 Harbour Green 
8 Sham Mong Road, West 
Kowloon 
JV 1517 1517 
2006 The Vineyard 
23 Ngau Tam Mei Road, Yuen 
Long 
100 160 160 
2006 Manhattan Hill 1 Po Lun Street, West Kowloon 33 1162 383.46 
2006 Park Island Phase 5 8 Pak Lai Road, Ma Wan JV 1230 1230 
2006 Noble Hill 38 Ma Sik Road, Sheung Shui 100 796 796 
2006 Chelsea Court 100 Yeung Uk Road, Tsuen Wan 100 1624 1624 
2006 1 Ho Man Tin Hill 1 Ho Man Tin Hill Road JV 112 112 
 6601 5822 
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Developments of Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited 
 
Year Development Name Location 
Group 's 
Interest 
No. of 
units 
Attributable 
Units to the 
Group 
1995 
South Horizons: Phase 4 
(The Oasis) 
Ap Lei Chau, I.L. No. 121 R.P. Hong Kong 30 2520 756 
1995 
The Grand Panorama 
(Phase 2, Blocks 2 and 3) 
10 Robinson Road, Hong Kong 50 558 279 
1995 
Kenswood Court, 
Kingswood Villas (Blocks 
8 to 14) 
Tin Shui Wai Town Lot No.7 R.P. Yuen Long 48.25 1985 957.7625 
 5063 1993 
 
1996 University Heights 23 Pokfield Road, Pokfulam 50 444 222 
1996 
Lynwood Court, 
Kingswood Villas (Blocks 
1 to 10) 
Tin Shui Wai Town Lot No.5 Yuen Long 48.25 2865 1382.3625
 3309 1604 
 
1997 
Maywood Court, 
Kingswood Villas (Blocks 
1-8) 
Tin Shui Wai Town Lot No.6 48.25 2305 1112 
 
1998 The Paramount Tai Po Town Lot. No. 97 35 123 43.05 
1998 DeerHill Bay Tai Po Town Lot. No. 135 JV 364 364 
1998 Tierra Verde Phase I Tsing Yi Town Lot. No. 132 JV 1474 1474 
1998 
Laguna Verde: The 
GreenWood 
Kowloon Inland Lot. No. 11056 JV 741 741 
1998 Villa Esplanada Phase I Tsing Yi Town Lot. No. 129 22.5 792 178.2 
1998 Vista Paradiso Phase I Sha Tin Town Lot. No. 338 50 1012 506 
 4506 3306 
 
1999 Vista Paradiso Phase II Sha Tin Town Lot. No. 338 50 1020 510 
1999 Villa d' Arte Inland Lot. No. 8857 90 100 90 
1999 Tierra Verde Phase II Tsing Yi Town Lot. No. 132 JV 2084 2084 
1999 Laguna Verde: Villa Verde Kowloon Inland Lot. No. 11056 JV 728 728 
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1999 The Portofino Lot. No. 849 in D.D. 225 Clear Water Bay 100 72 72 
1999 Villa Esplanada Phase II Tsing Yi Town Lot. No. 129 22.5 832 187.2 
 4836 3671 
 
2000 Manhattan Heights  
Marine Lot No. 245 s.E, R.P., s.B R.P., s.B ss. 
1 R.P., s.B ss. 2 and s.B ss. 1 s.A 
44.8 476 213.248 
2000 Peninsula Heights New Kowloon Inland Lot. No. 5104 50 178 89 
2000 
Laguna Verde: Costa del 
Sol 
Kowloon Inland Lot. No. 11056 JV 1104 1104 
2000 Monte Vista Sha Tin Town Lot No. 446 50 1606 803 
2000 Sheffield Villas Lot No. 4295 in D.D. 124 Yuen Long 50 56 28 
 3420 2237 
 
2001 
Green Wood Laguna 
Verde (Blocks 1-5) 
Kowloon Inland Lot. No. 11056 JV 741 741 
2001 No.1 Star Street 
The Remaining Portion of Section A of Inland 
Lot No. 2837 
100 170 170 
2001 Villa Esplanada Phase III Tsing Yi Town Lot No. 11077 22.5 1200 270 
2001 University Court 
Section A of New Kowloon Inland Lot No. 
2491 
100 37 37 
2001 
Laguna Grande, Laguna 
Verde 
Kowloon Inland Lot No. 11056 JV 1380 1380 
2001 
Ocean Vista, Laguna 
Verde 
Kowloon Inland Lot No. 11056 JV 785 785 
2001 Harbourfront Landmark Kowloon Inland Lot No. 11055 50 330 165 
 4643 3548 
 
2002 
Carribbean Coast: 
Monterey Cove 
Tung Chung Town Lot No.5 JV 1552 1552 
2002 The Metropolis Residence Kowloon Inland Lot No. 11077 JV 662 662 
2002 Nob Hill  Kwai Chung Town Lot No. 474 50 696 348 
2002 Queen's Terrace Tower 3 
The Remaining Portion of Inland Lot No. 
8897 
JV 306 306 
2002 The Victoria Towers 
The Rhe Remaining Portion of Kowloon 
Inland Lot No. 11086 
42.5 988 419.9 
 4204 3288 
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2003 Banyan Garden Phase I New Kewloon Inland lot No. 6320 JV 1072 1072 
2003 
Queen's Terrace Towers 1 
and 2 
The Remaining Portion of Inland Lot No. 
8897 
JV 870 870 
2003 Hampton Place Kowloon Inland Lot No. 11107 100 880 880 
2003 Princeton Tower 
The Remaining Portions of Inland Lots Nos. 
3999-4005 
100 156 156 
2003 Rambler Crest Tsing Yi Town Lot No. 140 30 1590 477 
2003 Seasons Villas  
The Remaining Portion and The Extension 
thereto of Lot No. 815 in D.D. 110 Yuen Long
100 112 112 
 4680 3567 
 
2004 
Banyan Garden Phases 2 
and 3 
New Kowloon Inland Lot No. 6320 JV 1456 1456 
2004 
Caribbean Coast: Albany 
Cove 
Tung Chung Town Lot No.5 JV 1240 1240 
2004 The Cairnhill Tsuen Wan Town Lot No. 395 50 771 385.5 
2004 One Beacon Hill New Kowloon Inland Lot No. 6277 100 607 607 
2004 Sky Tower 
The Remaining Portion of Kowloon Inland 
Lot No. 27 
40 2209 883.6 
2004 Vianni Cove Tin Shui Wai Town Lot No. 27 60 1091 654.6 
 7374 5227 
 
2005 
The Pacifica Phases 1 and 
2 
New Kowloon Inland Lot No. 6275 50 2285 1142.5 
2005 
Caribbean Coast: Carmel 
Cove 
Tung Chung Town Lot No.5  JV 1664 1664 
2005 St. Paul Terrace No. 42A MacDonnell Road 100 9 9 
 3958 2816 
 
2006 The Legend Jardine's Lookout 100 380 380 
2006 
Carribbean Coast: Crystal 
Cove 
Tung Chung JV 824 824 
2006 
Central Park Towers Phase 
1 
Tin Shui Wai Town Lot No. 24 98.47 1972 1941.8284
2006 Metro Town Phase 1 
Tseung Kwan O Town Lot no. 73, Area 73B 
Tseung Kwan O 
JV 1678 1678 
2006 Seasons Palace The Remaining Portion of Lot no. 2286 in 100 104 104 
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D.D. 106 Kam Sheung Road, Kam Tin, Yuen 
Long 
 4958 4928 
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Developments of Henderson Land Development Company Limited 
 
Year Development Name Location 
Group 's 
Interest
No. of 
units 
Attributable 
Units to the 
Group 
1995 Royal Court 9M Kennedy Road 64.14 186  119  
1995 Flora Plaza Fanling Sheung Shui Town Lot No. 113 60 2710  1626  
1995 
The Grand Panorama 
(Phase 2) 
10 Robinson Road 50 304  152  
1995 Tak Lee Court 10-16 Ko Shan Road 48.54 48  23  
1995 Skyline Plaza Tsuen Wan Town Lot No. 324 100 280  280  
 3528  2201  
 
1996 Dragon Court 28 Caine Road 100 52  52  
1996 Metro City (Phase 1) Town Lot No. 36, Tseung Kwan O 100 2048  2048  
1996 
The Tolo Place, 
Sunshine City 
Sha Tin Town, Lot No. 392 100 616  616  
1996 Fairview Height 
1-3 Seymour Road/ 54-62 Robinson 
Road 
87.3 198  173  
1996 Winsome Park 
42 Conduit Road/ 69A, 69C, 69D & 69E 
Robinson Road 
85 120  102  
1996 Imperial Court 62G Conduit Road 100 196  196  
1996 
Florence Plaza (Phase 
1) 
New Kowloon Inland Lot No. 6154  90.79 198  180  
1996 Lagoon Court Tai Po Town Lot No. 126 100 136  136  
 3564  3503  
 
1997 
Newton Harbour View 
(Tower 1) 
2 Shau Kei Wan Main Street East (Shau 
Kei Wan Inland Lot Nos. 825 and 835) 
100 98  98  
1997 
Hop Yick Plaza (Block 
B) 
Yuen Long Town Lot No. 488 100 64  64  
1997 Silver Mansion 75-81 Shek Pai Wan Road 100 54  54  
1997 Charmview Court 73 Pokfulam Road 100 48  48  
1997 Welland Plaza 184-200 Nam Cheong Street 100 88  88  
1997 Granville Garden Sha Tin Town, Lot No. 410 100 666  666  
 1018  1018  
1998 Fu Yan Court 23 Sai Wan Ho Street 100 88  88  
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1998 Evergreen Place 
Lot No. 2042 in D.D. No. 121, Yuen 
Long 
60 88  53  
1998 Belair Monte Fanling Sheung Shui Town Lot No. 126 13 1680  218  
1998 Greenfields Yuen Long Town Lot No. 463 7 480  34  
 2336  393  
 
1999 Imperial Terrace 356 Queen’s Road West 100 88  88  
1999 The Gracedale 23 Yuk Sau Street 100 50  50  
1999 
Tung Chung Crescent 
-Blocks 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 
Tung Chung Town Lot No. 1 20 1212  242  
1999 Casa Marina Tai Po Town Lot No. 117 100 98  98  
1999 La Cité Noble Tseung Kwan O Town Lot No. 40 100 2184  2184  
1999 Dawning Views Fanling Sheung Shui Town Lot No. 193 100 2688  2688  
1999 The City Culture 38A Ko Shan Road 100 19  19  
1999 
Newton Harbour View - 
Tower II 
2 Shau Kei Wan, Main Street East (Shau 
Kei Wan Inland 
Lot No. 825 R.P.) 
100 224  224  
1999 Honor Villa 75 Caine Road 44.58 78  35  
1999 
The Metropolis (Metro 
City - Phase III) 
Tseung Kwan O Town Lot No. 34 100 1376  1376  
1999 
Tung Chung Crescent - 
Blocks 7 to 9 
Tung Chung Town Lot No. 1 20 991  198  
 9008  7202  
 
2000 King’s Park Hill 
1-98 King’s Park Hill Road (Kowloon 
Inland Lot No. 11063) 
59.57 128  76  
2000 Metro City - Phase II Tseung Kwan O Town Lot No. 27 100 3344  3344  
2000 
Parkland Villas - Blocks 
1 to 6 
Tuen Mun Town Lot No. 377 R.P. 75.01 1152  864  
2000 Casa Marina II 
1 Lo Ping Road, Tai Po (Tai Po Town 
Lot No. 118) 
100 106  106  
2000 Palatial Crest 3 Seymour Road 63.35 189  120  
2000 Casa Bella 
117 Caine Road, Mid-Levels, Hong 
Kong 
50 124  62  
2000 
Parkland Villas – 
Blocks 7 to 9 
1 Tuen On Lane, Tuen Mun (Tuen Mun 
Town Lot No. 377 R.P.) 
75.01 576  432  
 5619  5004  
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2001 Royal Peninsula 
8 Hung Lai Road (Kowloon Inland Lot 
No. 11084) 
50 1669  835  
2001 Metropolitan Rise 28 Ma Tau Kok Road 80 288  230  
2001 Sereno Verde – Phase 1 99 Tai Tong Road, Yuen Long 44 721  317  
2001 Supernova Stand 28 Mercury Street 36.38 100  36  
 2778  1419  
 
2002 
Sereno Verde – Phase 2 
(Blocks 9 & 10) 
99 Tai Tong Road, Yuen Long 44 216  95  
2002 Wealth House 108 Castle Peak Road 100 34  34  
2002 Opulence Height 50 Castle Peak Road, Yuen Long 15.2 112  17  
2002 
The Beverly Hills- 
Phases 1 & 2 
Tai Po Town Lot  No. 161 90.1 372  335  
2002 Royal Terrace 933's King Road 100 240  240  
2002 Aegean Coast 
2 Kwun Tsing Road, So Kwun Wat, 
Castle Peak Road 
25 1624  406  
2002 City Regalia 198 Yee Kuk Street 100 80  80  
2002 
Sereno Verde – Phase 2 
(Blocks 13, 15 & 16) & 
La Pradera – Phases 3 
& 4 
99 Tai Tong Road, Yuen Long 44 312  137  
 2990  1345  
 
2003 Seaview Crescent 
8 Tung Chung Waterfront Road, Tung 
Chung (Tung Chung Town Lot No. 3) 
20 1537  307  
2003 
Park Central – Phases 1 
& 2 
Tseung Kwan O Town Lot Nos. 57 and 
66 
24.63 4152  1023  
2003 
Metro Harbour View – 
Phase 1 
8 Fuk Lee Street 73.02 1760  1285  
2003 Paradise Square 3 Kwong Wa Street 100 272  272  
2003 
Metro Harbour View - 
Phase 2 
8 Fuk Lee Street 73.02 1760  1285  
2003 Scenic Horizon 250 Shau Kei Wan Road 18.13 100  18  
 9581  4190  
 
2004 9 Durham Road 9 Durham Road 100 4  4  
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2004 Splendid Place 
16 Shipyard Lane/ 39 Taikoo Shing 
Road 
75 142  107  
 146  111  
2005 
Park Central — Phase 3 
(Central Heights) 
Tseung Kwan O Town Lot Nos. 57 and 
66 
25 390  98  
2005 The Sherwood 8 Fuk Hang Tsuen Road, Tuen Mun 100 1584  1584  
2005 The Verdancy 50 Tan Kwai Tsuen, Yuen Long 100 119  119  
2005 Royal Green — Phase 1 18 Ching Hiu Road, Sheung Shui 45 640  288  
2005 
Grand Promenade — 
Towers 2, 3 & 5 
38 Tai Hong Street, Sai Wan Ho 63.65 1144  728  
2005 
Grand Promenade - 
Towers 1 & 6 
38 Tai Hong Street, Sai Wan Ho 63.06 892  562  
 4769  3379  
 
2006 Centre Stage 
108 Hollywood Road and 1-17 Bridges 
Street 
100 407  407  
2006 Centre Place 1 High Street 100 95  95  
2006 Royal Green – Phase 2  18 Ching Hiu Road, Sheung Shui 45 282  127  
2006 Grand Waterfront 38 San Ma Tau Street, To Kwa Wan 46.08 1783  822  
 2567  1451  
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Developments of Sino Group 
 
Year Development Name Location 
Group 's 
Interest 
No. of 
units 
Attributable 
Units to the 
Group 
1995 Serenity Park II 
Tai Po Town Lot No. 80, New 
Territories 
4.6% 491  23  
1995 The Astrid Argyle Street, Kowloon, KIL No. 11005 50.0% 176  88  
1995 Parc Royale 
Area 30A, Shatin, New Territories, 
STTL No. 301 
22.0% 640  141  
1995 Sea Crest Terrace Mui Wo Lot No. 717 100.0% 45  45  
 1352  296  
 
1996 Dynasty View (Phase 1) 
Ma Wo, Tai Po, New Territories, Tai Po 
Town Lot No. 113 
100.0% 265  265  
1996 38 Repulse Bay Road 38 Repulse Bay Road, Hong Kong 100.0% 6  6  
 271  271  
 
1997 The Mayfair 
1, May Road, Hong Kong Inland Lot 
No. 8410 
100.0% 60  60  
1997 The Waterside 
Ma On Shan, Shatin, New Territories, 
Sha Tin Town Lot No. 393 
40.0% 502  201  
1997 Grand Palisades 
Tai Po, New Territories, Tai Po Town 
Lot No. 137 
20.0% 547  109  
1997 Grand Dynasty View 
Ma Wo, Tai Po, New Territories, Tai Po 
Town Lot No. 111 
100.0% 376  376  
 1485  746  
 
1998 Maritime Bay 
Tseung Kwan O, New Territories, 
TKOTL 49 
50.0% 736  368  
1998 Villa Oceania 
Ma On Shan, New Territories, STTL 
428 Area 100 
50.0% 551  276  
1998 Majestic Park Farm Road, Kowloon, KIL 11044 20.0% 476  95  
1998 Greenfields Yuen Long, New Territories, YLTL 463 12.9% 480  62  
1998 Belair Monte Fanling, New Territories, FSSTL 126 8.0% 1680  134  
 3923  935  
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1999 Dynasty Heights Lung Ping Road, Kowloon, NKIL 5924 50.0% 590  295  
1999 Bayview Park 
Hong Man Street, Chai Wan, Hong 
Kong, CWIL 156 
100.0% 212  212  
 802  507  
 
2000 Island Harbourview 
MTR Olympic Station, Site C, 
Kowloon, KIL 11074 
30.0% 2464  739  
2000 Springdale Villas 
Ma Tin Road, Yuen Long, New 
Territories, YLTL 491 
100.0% 204  204  
2000 Shek O Headland Hong Kong, SOIL 96 100.0% 1  1  
 2669  944  
 
2001 
Park Avenue: Phase 2 
(Central Park) 
KIL 11090, 18 Hoi Ting Road, MTR 
Olympic Station, Kowloon  
42.5% 1336  568  
2001 Island Resort 
28 Siu Sai Wan Road, Chai Wan, Hong 
Kong  
40.0% 3109  1244  
2001 Park Avenue: Phase 1 
18 Hoi Ting Road, MTR Olympic 
Station Site B, Kowloon, KIL11090 
42.5% 1660  706  
 6105  2517  
 
2002 Horizon Place 
100 Kwai Luen Road, Kwai Chung, 
New Territories 
100.0% 372  372  
2002 Sky Horizon 
35 Cloud View Road, North Point, 
Hong Kong 
100.0% 108  108  
 480  480  
 
2003 Ocean View 
1 Po Tai Street, Area 77, Ma On Shan, 
New Territories 
100.0% 911  911  
2003 
Imperial Villas Phase I 
& II 
1 & 8 Ping Chuk Lane, Ping Shan, Yuen 
Long, New Territories 
100.0% 299  299  
2003 The Cliveden 
98 Route Twisk, Area 40, Tsuen Wan, 
New Territories 
50.0% 211  106  
2003 Grand Regentville 
9 Wo Mun Street, Fanling, New 
Territories 
100.0% 666  666  
 2087  1982  
2004 Residence Oasis TKOTL No. 24, 15 Pui Shing Road, 60.0% 2134  1280  
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Tseung Kwan O 
2004 Oceania Heights 2 Hoi Chu Road, Tuen Mun 100.0% 544  544  
2004 The Cairnhill 
Route Twisk, TWTL 395, Area 40, 
Tsuen Wan 
25.0% 771  193  
2004 The Royal Oaks 
8 Kam Tsin South Road, Kam Tsin 
Lodge, Sheung Shui 
100.0% 44  44  
2004 Anglers' Bay 
18A Castle Peak Road, Sham Tseng, 
New Territories 
50.0% 249  125  
2004 Caldecott Hill 2 Caldecott Road, Piper's Hill, Kowloon 33.3% 88  29  
2004 Parc Palais 18 Wylie Road, King's Park, Kowloon 30.0% 700  210  
 4530  2425  
 
2005 St Andrews Place 
38 Kam Chui Road, Beas Stable, 
Sheung Shui 
100.0% 26  26  
 
2006 One SilverSea 18 Hoi Fai Road 100.0% 730  730  
2006 Mount Beacon 
20 Cornwall Street, Kowloon Tong, 
Kowloon 
33.0% 220  73  
 950  803  
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Developments of New World Development Company 
 
Year Development Name Location 
Group 's 
Interest 
No. of 
units 
Attributable 
Units to the 
Group 
1995 Li Chit Garden 1 Li Chit Street, Wan Chai 100% 180  180  
1995 Blessings Garden Phase 1 95 Robinson Road, Mid-Levels 100% 174  174  
1995 Blessings Garden Phase 2 56 Conduit Road, Mid-Levels 100% 174  174  
 528  528  
 
1996 
Crestmont Villa 
(low-rise) 
Phase IV, 4A East, Discovery Bay 100% 190  190  
1996 Coastline Villa (low-rise) Phase IV, 4C, Discovery Bay 100% 230  230  
1996 Scholastic Garden 48 Lyttelton Road, Mid-Levels 100% 280  280  
 700  700  
 
1997 Ko Chun Court 11 High Street 100% 26  26  
1997 
Discovery Park Phase 
One 
398 Castle Peak Road Tsuen Wan 50% 1120  560  
 1146  586  
 
1998 
Discovery Park Phase 
Two 
398 Castle Peak Road Tsuen Wan 50% 1120  560  
1998 
Discovery Park Phase 
Three 
398 Castle Peak Road Tsuen Wan 50% 1120  560  
1998 Belair Monte Luen Wo Hui, Fanling 12% 1680  202  
1998 Greenfields YLTL 463 Fung Kam Street, Yuen Long 7% 480  34  
 4400  1355  
 
1999 Harmony Garden 28 Luen Yan Street 100% 240  240  
1999 
Tung Chung Crescent 
Phase 1 
1 Hing Tung Street 16.40% 680  112  
1999 
Tung Chung Crescent 
Phase 2 
2 Mei Tung Street 16.40% 1523  250  
        2443  601  
 
2000 Villa Carlton 369 Tai Po Road, KLN 50% 126  63  
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2000 Dragon Pride Tin Hau Temple Road 60% 96  58  
2000 Rhythm Garden 242 Choi Hung Road 80.50% 3000  2415  
2000 Bijou Court 171 Prince Edward Road West 50% 84  42  
 3306  2578  
 
2001 The Belcher's 89 Pok Fu Lam Road 10% 2214  221  
2001 Monte Carlton 363 Tai Po Road, KLN 100% 82  82  
2001 Sereno Verde Phase 1 99 Tai Tong Road, Yuen Long, NT 56% 721  404  
2001 The Parcville 33 Kau Hui Road, Yuen Long 33.33% 1618  539  
 4635  1246  
 
2002 11-15 MacDonnell Rd 11-15 MacDonnell Rd, HK 33% 28  9  
2002 Sereno Verde Phase 2 99 Tai Tong Road, Yuen Long, NT 56% 528  296  
 556  305  
 
2003 Queen's Terrace Queen Street, Sheung Wan, HK 50% 1176  588  
2003 Seaview Crescent 
8 Tung Chung Waterfront Road, Tung 
Chung 
16.40% 1537  252  
2003 Bijou Apartments 157 Prince Edward Road West 50% 171  86  
 2884  926  
 
2004 Sky Tower 38 Sung Wong Toi Road, To Kwa Wan 20% 2209  442  
2004 Parc Palais 18 Wylie Road, King's Park Road 30% 700  210  
2004 2 Park Road 2 Park Road 100% 152  152  
2004 Bon-Point 11 Bonham Road, Mid-level 70% 128  90  
2004 Caldecott Hill 2 Caldecott Road 33.33% 88  29  
2004 33 Island Road 
33 Island Road, Deep Water Bay, Southern 
District 
43% 10  4  
 3287  927  
 
2005 South Hill Crest 3 Tuen Kwai Road, Fu Tei 96.46% 310  299  
2005 The Merton 
28 Kennedy Town New Praya, 8 Davies 
Street 
100% 1184  1184  
 1494  1483  
 
2006 The Grandiose 9 Tong Chun Street, Tseung Kwan O 45% 1472  662  
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Developments of Hang Lung Properties Limited 
 
Year 
Development 
Name 
Location 
Group 's 
Interest 
No. of 
units 
Attributable 
Units to the 
Group 
1996 Parc Versailles Mui Shu Hang Road, Tai Po 100% 822 822 
 
1998 Noble Place King Fung Path, Tuen Mun 100% 448 448 
 
2000 Baycrest Hang Ming Street, Ma On Shan 100% 618 618 
 
2002 The Summit Stubbs Road, Happy Valley 100% 54 54 
2002 Napa Valley Tuen Fu Road, Tuen Mun 100% 98 98 
2002 New Haven Sha Tsui Road, Tsuen Wan 100% 658 658 
 810 810 
 
2003 Carmel-on-the-Hill Carmel Village Street, Ho Man Tin 100% 188 188 
2003 The Harbourside 
Union Square, Airport Express 
Kowloon Station 
JV 1122 1122 
2003 Aqua Marine Sham Shing Road, West Kowloon 100% 1616 1616 
 2926 2926 
 
2004 The Long Beach Hoi Fai Road, West Kowloon 100% 1829 1829 
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Developments of Wheelock and Company Limited 
 
Year Development Name Location 
Group 's 
Interest 
No. of 
units 
Attributable 
Units to the 
Group 
1995 The Astrid 180 Argyle Street 50% 176 88 
1995 The Regalia 33 King's Park Rise 100% 302 302 
 478 390 
 
1996 Forest Hill 31 Lo Fai Road 100% 328 328 
 
1998 Galaxia 3 Lung Poon Street 100% 1684 1684 
 
2000 The Primrose 38 Rose Street 100% 16 16 
 
2002 Sorrento Phase 1 1 Austin Road West 100% 1272 1272 
 
2003 Bellagio Phase 1 33 Castle Peak Road 100% 1704 1704 
2003 Palm Cove 168 Castle Peak Road 100% 260 260 
2003 Sorrento Phase 2 1 Austin Road West 100% 854 854 
 2818 2818 
 
2004 Parc Palais  
18 King's Park Wylie 
Road 
20% 700 140 
 
2006 Bellagio Phase 2 33 Castle Peak Road 100% 848 848 
2006 Bellagio Phase 3 33 Castle Peak Road 100% 799 799 
2006 
Gough Hill 
Residences 
3-5 Gough Hill Path 100% 5 5 
2006 60 Victoria Road 60 Victoria Road 100% 82 82 
 1734 1734 
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Developments of Kerry Properties Limited 
 
Year Development Name Location 
Group 's 
Interest 
No. of 
units 
Attributable 
Units to the 
Group 
1997 111 High Street 111 High Street 100% 22  22  
 
1998 Valverde 
11 May Road, Mid-Levels, Hong 
Kong 
100% 82  82  
1998 Greenfields 
Fung Kam Street, Yuen Long, New 
Territories 
7% 480  34  
 562  116  
 
1999 Tavistock 10A Tregunter Path 10A 100% 98  98  
1999 Aigburth 
12 Tregunter Path, Mid-Levels, 
Hong Kong 
100% 65  65  
1999 Tavistock II 10A Tregunter Path 10A 100% 98  98  
 261  261  
 
2000 Ocean Pointe 8 Sham Tsz Street 100% 558  558  
2000 
Island Harbourview, 
Olympian City 
11 Hoi Fai Road 20% 2412  482  
 2970  1040  
 
2001 
Park Avenue, Olympian 
City 
18 Hoi Ting Road 33% 1625  528  
2001 
Central Park, Olympian 
City 
18 Hoi Ting Road 33% 1312  426  
 2937  955  
 
2002 Constellation Cove 
1 Hung Lam Drive, Tai Po Kau, Tai 
Po, New Territories 
75% 286  215  
2002 Jupiter Terrace 
18 Jupiter Street, North Point, Hong 
Kong 
100% 188  188  
 474  403  
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2003 The Cliveden 98 Route Twisk 50% 210  105  
2004 Residence Oasis 15 Pui Shing Road 40% 2134  854  
2004 Branksome Crest 3A Tregunter Path 100% 64  64  
 2198  918  
 
2006 15 Homantin Hill 15 Homantin Hill Road 100% 73  73  
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Developments of Hutchison Whampoa Limited 
Year Development Name Location 
Group 's 
Interest
No. of 
units 
Attributable 
Units to the 
Group 
1995 
South Horizons: Phase 4 
(The Oasis) 
Ap Lei Chau, I.L. No. 121 R.P. 
Hong Kong 
70% 2520  1764  
 
1998 The Paramount 23 Shan Tong Road 35% 123  43  
1998 Vista Paradiso Phase 1  Sha Tin Town Lot. No. 338 50% 1012  506  
 1135  549  
 
1999 Tierra Verde 
Tsing Yi Airport Railway 
Station, New Territories 
60% 3558  2135  
1999 Vista Paradiso Phase 2 Sha Tin Town Lot. No. 338 50% 1020  510  
1999 Monte Vista Ma On Shan, New Territories 50% 1606  803  
 6184  3448  
 
2000 Peninsula Heights 77 Boardcast Drive, Kowloon 50% 178  89  
 
2001 Harbourfront Landmark Wan Hoi Street, Hung Hom 50% 330  165  
 
2002 
Caribbean Coast: Phase 1 
(Monterey Cove) 
Tung Chung, New Territories 50% 1552  776  
2002 The Victoria Towers Canton Road, Kowloon 43% 988  425  
 2540  1201  
 
2003 Rambler Crest  Tsing Yi Town Lot No. 140 70% 1590  1113  
 
2004 
Caribbean Coast: Phase 2 
(Albany Cove) 
Tung Chung, New Territories 50% 1240  620  
 
2005 
Caribbean Coast: Phase 3 
(Carmel Cove) 
Tung Chung, New Territories 50% 1664  832  
 
2006 
Caribbean Coast: Phase 4 
(Crystal Cove) 
Tung Chung, New Territories 50% 824  412  
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Appendix 2: List of Large-Scale Private Residential Development 
 
Development Project Developer Units Blocks Storeys 
Sea Crest Villa Sun Hung Kai 2224 13 28-37
Pristine Villa Sun Hung Kai 498 14 8-10
Royal Ascot  Sun Hung Kai 2504 10 37-40
East Point City Sun Hung Kai 2184 7 39
Grand Del Sol  Sun Hung Kai 1100 13 11
Symphony Bay Sun Hung Kai 972 26 6-12
Villa Esplanada  Sun Hung Kai 2824 10 35-40
Tung Chung Crescent  Sun Hung Kai 2203 8 30-43
The Belcher's  Sun Hung Kai 2214 6 47-48
The Parcville Sun Hung Kai 1618 14 13-15
Ocean Shores  Sun Hung Kai 5728 15 48
Park Island  Sun Hung Kai 5252 28 25-26
Park Central  Sun Hung Kai 4542 12 48
Liberte Sun Hung Kai 2439 7 37-46
The Pacifica  Sun Hung Kai 2285 6 45-51
YOHO Town  Sun Hung Kai 2201 8 37
South Horizons Cheung Kong 9812 34 35-40
Kingswood Villas Cheung Kong 15924 58 32-39
DeerHill Bay Cheung Kong 364 32 5-11
Tierra Verde  Cheung Kong 3558 12 38-40
Laguna Verde Cheung Kong 4738 25 19-33
Villa Esplanada Cheung Kong 2824 10 35-40
Vista Paradiso Cheung Kong 2032 11 23-30
Monte Vista Cheung Kong 1606 12 26-30
Caribbean Coast Cheung Kong 5280 13 49-52
Banyan Garden Cheung Kong 2528 7 48-49
The Cairnhill Cheung Kong 771 16 12
One Beacon Hill Cheung Kong 607 16 12
Sky Tower Cheung Kong 2209 6 47
The Pacifica Cheung Kong 2285 6 45-51
Metro Town Cheung Kong 3774 9 53-55
Flora Plaza Henderson 2710 34 10
Metro City  Henderson 6768 21 38-43
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Sunshine City Henderson 4760 20 29-33
Tung Chung Crescent Henderson 2203 8 30-43
La Cité Noble Henderson 2184 6 44-47
Dawning Views Henderson 2688 12 29
Sereno Verde Henderson 1674 16 13-14
Park Central Henderson 4542 12 48
Metro Harbour View Henderson 3520 10 44
The Sherwood Henderson 1584 12 16-17
Grand Promenade  Henderson 2052 5 62-65
Discovery Park NWD 3360 12 40
Tung Chung Crescent NWD 2203 8 30-43
Rhythm Garden NWD 3000 12 22-30
The Belcher's NWD 2214 6 47-48
Sereno Verde NWD 1674 16 13-14
The Parcville NWD 1618 14 13-15
Sky Tower NWD 2209 6 47
Serenity Park Sino 2476 15 21-22
Parc Royale Sino 640 11 19-20
Dynasty View  Sino 1436 27 8-12
Dynasty Heights Sino 590 22 5-11
Island Harbourview Sino 2464 9 35-39
Park Avenue Sino 2996 9 42-45
Island Resort Sino 3109 8 50-51
Residence Oasis Sino 2134 6 48-49
The Cairnhill Sino 771 16 12
Sorrento Wheelock 2126 5 55-65
Bellagio  Wheelock 3351 8 54
Island Harbourview Kerry 2464 9 35-39
Residence Oasis Kerry 2134 6 48-49
Park Avenue Kerry 2996 9 42-45
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Auction Date Location Use Winning Bid 
(million) 
Buildable area 
(sq. ft.) 
Winner 
20/04/1999 35 & 37 CLOUD VIEW RD R2 590.0 134,225 Sino Group 
20/04/1999 83 BROADCAST DRIVE R2 515.0 137,000 K. Wah  
20/04/1999 AREA 58, SIU LAM, TUEN MUN R3 385.0 270,316 Nan Fung 
29/06/1999 NOS. 1-3 HOMESTEAD ROAD,THE PEAK R3 265.0 32,292 Small Developer (Kwai Hung Group) 
29/06/1999 KWAI LUEN ROAD, KWAI CHUNG R1 470.0 220,682 Sino Group 
29/06/1999 AREA 12, TAI PO  R3 44.0 13,490 Small Developer (Glory Fortune Development 
Limited) 
8/4/1999 No. 99 PEAK ROAD/NO.4 GOUGH HILL PATH, THE PEAK R3 134.0 13,251 Small Developer (Prudential) 
8/4/1999 CASTLE PEAK ROAD, AREA 58, SIU LAM, TUEN MUN R3 330.0 236,985 Small Developer (USI, Manhattan Garments 
and Singapore Financial Group) 
8/4/1999 HANG KWAI STREET, AREA 16, TUEN MUN R1 320.0 250,000 K. Wah  
8/4/1999 SAI WAN, CHEUNG CHAU R4 4.5 9,171 Small Developer 
14/10/1999 TIN SHUI WAI, YUEN LONG R1 555.0 801,972 Cheung Kong 
14/10/1999 ADJOINING NO. 14 SOUTH BAY ROAD R3 151.0 21,959 Small Developer (怡華益新) 
13/12/1999 HOI FAN ROAD, WEST KOWLOON RECLAMATION R1 1,340.0 565,020 Cheung Kong 
13/12/1999 AREA 38,TAI PO R3 152.0 96,781 Small Developer (Emperor Group) 
29/02/2000 SEVERN ROAD, HONG KONG R3 490.0 58,665 Sun Hung Kai 
29/02/2000 YIU HING ROAD, SHAUKEIWAN, HONG KONG R1 170.0 75,848 Small Developer (Asia Standard Group) 
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29/02/2000 CHEUNG SHA, LANTAU ISLAND R4 17.2 14,553 Small Developer (Tack Hsin Holdings) 
25/04/2000 JUNCTION OF HING WAH STREET WEST & SHAM SHING 
ROAD, WEST KOWLOON RECLAMATION 
R1 1,900.0 1,556,245 Cheung Kong 
25/04/2000 ADJOINING NOS. 16-18 SOUTH BAY ROAD, REPULSE BAY R3 130.0 18,644 Small Developer (Higo Force Company Ltd.) 
6/12/2000 JUNCTION OF CARMEL VILLAGE STREET AND HAU MAN 
STREET, KOWLOON 
R1 251.0 137,618 Hang Hung Development 
6/12/2000 BEAS STABLE, SHEUNG SHUI, NEW TERRITORIES R4 93.0 99,000 Sino Group 
29/08/2000 AREA 77,  MA ON SHAN,   NEW TERRITORIES R2 865.0 612,472 Sino Group 
29/08/2000 AREA 40, ROUTE TWISK, TSUEN WAN, NEW TERRITORIES R3 292.0 225,750 Kerry Properties and Sino Group 
10/5/2000 AREA 40, ROUTE TWISK, TSUEN WAN R3 835.0 827,658 Cheung Kong, Kerry Properties and Sino 
Group 
10/5/2000 J/O FARM ROAD AND MA TAU WAI ROAD, MA TAU WAI R1 540.0 268,000 Sun Hung Kai 
10/5/2000 SHAM TSENG, TSUEN WAN R3 240.0 177,335 Kerry Properties and Sino Group 
12/7/2000 HOI FAI ROAD, WEST KOWLOON RECLAMATION, KOWLOON R1 2,580.0 151,500 Hang Hung Development 
12/7/2000 CHUK KOK, SAI KUNG, NEW TERRITORIES R4 21.0 12,000 Small Developer (Far East Consortium 
International Limited) 
19/02/2001 AREA 77,  MA ON SHAN, SHA TIN, NEW TERRITORIES R2 560.0 392,886 K. Wah  
19/02/2001 TUI MIN HOI, SAI KUNG, NEW TERRITORIES R3 73.5 41,500 Small Developer (健聯發展) 
19/06/2001 J/O LOK HA SQUARE, LOK LIN PATH, AREA 43, SHA TIN R3 38.5 29,170 Small Developer (Yu Tai Hing) 
19/06/2001 SZE PEI SQUARE, TSUEN WAN CR 41.0 23,078 Small Developer (榮國集團) 
13/08/2001 MAN KEI TOI, PAK SHA WAN, SAI KUNG R3 148.0 115,000 Small Developer (USI) 
13/08/2001 OFF PING CHUK LANE, PING SHAN, YUEN LONG R1 44.0 72,100 Sino Group 
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16/10/2001 2 & 4 CALDECOTT ROAD, PIPER'S HILL, KOWLOON R3 110.0 77,000 New World Development and Sino Group 
16/10/2001 TAI MONG TSAI,  SAI KUNG, NEW TERRITORIES R4 23.5 20,000 Small Developer (Wing Fung) 
12/4/2001 3 CALDECOTT ROAD, PIPER  HILL, KOWLOON　  R3 170.0 83,000 K. Wah  
12/4/2001 OFF PING CHUK LANE, PING SHAN, YUEN LONG,  NEW 
TERRITORIES 
R1 62.0 107,000 Sino Group 
2/4/2002 HOI CHU ROAD, AREA 16, TUEN MUN, NEW TERRITORIES R1 264.0 380,000 Sino Group 
2/4/2002 AREA 11, TAI PO KAU, TAI PO, NEW TERRITORIES R3 37.0 27,125 Small Developer (Law's Group) 
15/04/2002 HOI FAI ROAD, WEST KOWLOON RECLAMATION, KOWLOON R1 1,640.0 840,000 Sino Group 
15/04/2002 JUNCTION OF CORNWALL STREET AND TAT CHEE AVENUE, 
KOWLOON 
R3 570.0 301,177 Sino Group, China Estates Holdings 
15/04/2002 No. 2 LOK KWAI PATH, AREA 43, SHA TIN, NEW TERRITORIES R3 660.0 436,265 Nan Fung, Winstate Asia 
15/04/2002 CAPE ROAD, CHUNG HOM KOK, HONG KONG R3 100.0 30,000 Small Developer (Tai Cheung) 
17/06/2002 NO. 632 KING'S ROAD, NORTH POINT, HONG KONG R1 310.0 159,784 Nan Fung 
17/06/2002 KONG PUI STREET, AREA 5B, SHA TIN, NEW TERRITORIES R1 112.0 84,831 Small Developer (Law's Group) 
9/10/2002 SA PO ROAD, KOWLOON R1 290.0 223,229 Chinachem 
9/10/2002 47 SHEK PAI WAN ROAD, ABERDEEN, HONG KONG CR 83.0 77,620 Small Developer (Yu Tai Hing) 
25/5/2004 AREA 77, MA ON SHAN, SHA TIN, NEW TERRITORIES R2 2,090.0 753,000 Cheung Kong 
25/5/2004 TUNG LO WAN HILL ROAD, SHA TIN, NEW TERRITORIES R2 865.0 260,800 K. Wah  
15/6/2004 SA PO ROAD, KOWLOON R1 1,010.0 341,100 Chinachem 
10/12/2004 SHEUNG SHING STREET, HOMANTIN, KOWLOON R1 9,420.0 1,720,000 Cheung Kong 
10/12/2004 JUNCTION OF KING FUK STREET, KING TAI STREET AND 
PRINCE EDWARD ROAD EAST, SAN PO KONG, KOWLOON 
R1 4,700.0 1,230,044 Sun Hung Kai 
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27/9/2005 HOI TING ROAD,WEST KOWLOON RECLAMATION AREA R1 3,190.0 597,154 Sino Group 
27/9/2005 JUNCTION OF HOI WANG ROAD AND HOI TING ROAD,WEST 
KOWLOON 
RECLAMATION AREA 
R2 2,730.0 498,840 Sino Group 
27/9/2005 FUNG SHING STREET, NGAU CHI WAN, KOWLOON R2 4,230.0 778,183 Sun Hung Kai 
18.7.2006 CHEUNG SHA, LANTAU ISLAND, NEW TERRITORIES R4 30.5 9,645 Small Developer (tak Hing) 
12.9.2006 CASTLE PEAK ROAD – TSING LUNG TAU, NEW TERRITORIES R3 53.0 8,934 Sun Hung Kai 
28.11.2006 1 BROADCAST DRIVE, KOWLOON TONG, KOWLOON R2 1,940.0 196,594 Sino Group 
28.11.2006 AREA 77, MA ON SHAN, SHA TIN, NEW TERRITORIES R2 3,240.0 884,801 Cheung Kong 
19.12.2006 NO. 12 MOUNT KELLETT ROAD, THE PEAK, HONG KONG R3 1,800.0 42,658 Sun Hung Kai 
13.3.2007 PAK SHEK KOK RECLAMATION PHASE I, SITE A, TAI PO, NEW 
TERRITORIES 
R2 2,110.0 345,400 Sino Group and Nan Fung 
13.3.2007 PAK SHEK KOK RECLAMATION PHASE I, SITE C, TAI PO, NEW
TERRITORIES 
R2 3,500.0 749,700 Nan Fung(50%) Ka Wah (25%) Sino 
Group (25%) 
13.3.2007 JUNCTION OF PLOVER COVE ROAD AND PO WU LANE, TAI PO, 
NEW TERRITORIES 
CR 570.0 177,606 Chinachem 
27.3.2007 SHUI HANG, CHEUNG CHAU R4 96.5 44,692 Small Developer (Cheuk Nang Holdings) 
8.5.2007 JUNCTION OF HOI WANG ROAD, YAN CHEUNG ROAD AND 
YAU CHEUNG ROAD, WEST KOWLOON RECLAMATION 
AREA,KOWLOON 
R1 4,000.0 650,684 Sino Group 
29.5.2007 TSING LUNG ROAD, AREA 58, SIU LAM, TUEN MUN, NEW 
TERRITORIES 
R3 960.0 208,500 Small Developer (USI) 
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29.5.2007 TSING FAT LANE, AREA 58, SIU LAM, TUEN MUN, NEW 
TERRITORIES 
R3 780.0 238,400 Chinachem 
12.6.2007 HOI FAI ROAD, KOWLOON R1 5,560.0 916,500 Sun Hung Kai 
31.7.2007 3 CHUN YAN STREET, WONG TAI SIN, KOWLOON R1 3,980.0 920,516 Kerry Properties 
(Source: Yeung 2008) 
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Appendix 4: Return on Assets of developers, 1995-2006 
 
 Sun Hung Kai Cheung Kong
Hendenson 
Land 
Sino Land 
New World 
Development 
Wheelock 
Kerry 
Properties 
Hang Lung 
2006 8.2497% 7.2358% 7.3875% 8.6187% 2.9930% 4.6977% 8.9474% 9.2002% 
2005 8.6006% 6.4724% 10.7595% 8.9545% 0.9283% 8.6152% 6.7808% 7.2932% 
2004 9.1265% 5.2034% 10.3693% 10.1257% 2.4139% 9.0223% 5.5198% 12.8316% 
2003 4.0290% 4.4266% 6.5831% 3.0892% -0.8783% 6.3114% 1.2801% 9.7743% 
2002 3.9670% 4.4162% 2.3879% 0.0861% -4.0761% -5.0550% 1.8810% 2.1446% 
2001 4.8962% 3.6828% 2.3746% 0.6337% 1.0059% 0.4411% 1.1057% 3.0589% 
2000 4.6551% 10.2969% 4.7220% 1.2906% 0.0356% 0.9685% 1.8548% 3.4134% 
1999 6.3353% 34.0972% 6.0815% 3.6291% 0.1679% 1.5085% 3.0970% 3.2127% 
1998 5.8050% 6.2599% 5.8403% 4.1334% 1.1516% 1.1315% 3.1448% 5.3538% 
1997 4.3154% 16.3913% 5.2278% 2.4053% 2.0466% 1.8574% 3.7824% 7.4732% 
1996 7.5186% 14.3958% 9.3622% 3.8528% 4.8888% 3.0991% 3.1701% 5.8726% 
1995 7.9739% 17.6165% 10.6220% 3.1832% 4.3329% 5.2713% 1.5410% 4.3755% 
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